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v
Summary
In this thesis, we use game theoretical approaches to study several cooperation issues
in wireless networks.
Firstly, we investigate the coverage problem in wireless sensor networks. We
assume that nodes are randomly scattered in a field and the goal is to partition these
nodes intoK sets. At any given time, nodes belonging to only one of these sets actively
sense the field. A key challenge is to achieve this partition in a distributed manner
with purely local information and yet provide near optimal coverage. We formulate
this coverage problem as a coverage game and prove that the optimal solution is a
pure Nash equilibrium. We then design synchronous and asynchronous algorithms,
which converge to the pure Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we analyze the optimality
and complexity of the pure Nash equilibrium in the coverage game, and validate the
theoretical results through extensive simulations.
Next, we investigate the WiFi sharing problem in wireless community networks
(WCNs). WCNs, where users share wireless bandwidth, has attracted tremendous
interest from academia and industry. Companies such as FON have been successful
in attracting large communities of users. However, solutions such as FON either
require users to buy specialized FON routers or implement firmware modifications
to existing routers. We propose a solution which does not require such sophisticated
hardware and only requires users to install a client software in their PCs. While this
solution appears simple, it raises several issues of incentivizing users to share their
bandwidth and also issues of preventing users from cheating behaviors which give
them an unfair advantage. By making simple but plausible assumptions about user
behavior, we show via analysis and extensive simulations that the system converges
to a Pareto Optimal Nash equilibrium. We further validate our system model, by
running trace-driven simulations on real world data.
Finally, we study the fairness problem in credit-based WiFi sharing community.
Under credit system, users obtain no more service than they share. Some users,
located in unpopular areas accumulate few credits and are unable to access other
networks when they roam. Meanwhile, other users located in hot-spots, accumu-
late extra credits, which they have no way to spend. A priority pricing based WiFi
sharing solution (“PP-WiSh”), which is also a pure client software solution, is pro-
vided to solve this problem. PP-WiSh allows users located in popular areas to spend
the excess credits they accumulate for better service and also helps users located in
unpopular areas to accumulate extra credits which they can utilize when roaming.
We formulate the priority pricing WiFi sharing problem as a distributed optimiza-
tion problem and theoretically analyze the equilibrium pricing solution of users in
the community. Moreover, we prove that all the users with rational and intelligent
behaviors will converge to this equilibrium and we demonstrate the convergence and
performance improvements through experiments using real world trace data.
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In recent years wireless networks have witnessed tremendous growth and become one
of the fastest growing segments in telecommunications field. Due to the energy and
resource constraints, current wireless networks (e.g., ad hoc networks, wireless sensor
networks, mesh networks, etc.), more and more, desire the decentralized operations
and self configurations. In some ad hoc networks and wireless sensor network, no cen-
tral authority exists, every aspect of the configurations and operations are completely
distributed in the mobile nodes, and each mobile node can only make decisions based
on the local information and interactions with the neighboring nodes.
Therefore, game theory, a study of interactions between autonomous agents, is
applied in the wireless networks to analyze the interactive decision-making processes
of the distributed wireless nodes, and design effective schemes to incentivize the co-
operation among wireless nodes and achieve the network wide objectives.
A lot of interests have already been emerging on applying game theory to study
the wireless networking issues [1, 2, 3, 4]. The self-organized networking nodes nor-
mally can be regarded as the autonomous agents in the game, and each node runs
a distributed protocol to make its own decisions. Normally, each node’s decisions
depend on the other nodes’ decisions. The objectives, nodes seek to optimize when
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making the decisions, can be categorized in the following cases: (1) nodes seek to
achieve the common good of the network as a whole; (2) nodes behave selfishly and
are only interested in their own benefits; (3) nodes behave maliciously and want to
damage other users’ benefits. In the second and third cases, the application of game
theory may be straightforward, as game theory traditionally analyzes situations where
players’ objectives are in conflict. In the first case, although all the nodes share the
same objective (the common good of the network), they may each have a unique per-
spective on the current network state, which will lead to possible conflicts concerning
on the best decisions to make. Game theory is useful not only for selfish users but for
distributed systems with limited local information. Therefore, we can see that game
theory can provide us a very good view to study and analyze the wireless network
issues.
1.1 Challenges
Several challenges exist when applying game theory in wireless networks.
Firstly, correctly recognize the game problem. A problem is a game only if there
are multiple agents involved and their decision making processes are correlated with
each other. In some case, the problem may be better solved through an optimization
algorithm, if not much decision-making interactions exist in the problem. So it is im-
portant to identify the feature of the problem and then decide whether it is necessary
to apply game theory.
Secondly, clearly and properly define the game and the settings. It is important
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to clearly state who are the players of the game, what strategies are available to the
players and what are the players’ objectives. The proper settings sometimes can help
reduce the problem complexity, guarantee the equilibrium existence, and even make
it easier to design the dynamical convergence process for the players.
Finally, justify the utility function formulation. This is a very important and also
the most challenging issue in the game theory formulation. We discuss two typical
scenarios here. First scenario is the real life scenario, where users have clear prefer-
ences on what they like and dislike, e.g., internet users normally prefer shorter delay
and higher throughput. In this case, users’ utility function are normally formulated
according to users’ preferences. However, it is very difficult to accurately quantify
users’ preferences, i.e., it is unlike to use a parametrized utility function to exactly
represent users’ utilities. So the researchers normally claim a preference relations of
users’ utility based on some assumptions. For example, once users are assumed to
prefer shorter delay, the utility with shorter delay must be higher than the one with
longer delay, with all the others conditions equal. This approach sometimes can pro-
duce beautiful results, however, it is still a very challenging task to execute it well.
Second scenario is the “engineering” scenario, where all the nodes in the system are
programmed by the engineers, thus the engineers can choose whatever utility function
they desire. The challenge in this scenario lies in explaining why a particular utility
function has been chosen and why game theory is being employed at all.
In addition, although game theory is a valuable tool for approaching a number
of different networking problems, there still exist a lot of problems, which cannot be
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properly solved by game theory. So it is also important to correctly recognize a game
problem, and see whether game theory is suitable for this problem. Game theory, like
any other tool, must be used carefully and on the right problems.
1.2 Related Work
To better illustrate the criterion we introduced above, in this section, we introduce
some previous successful examples of applying game theory in the networking studies.
Most examples are from the following three issues: power control, selfish routing and
cooperation incentivizing designs.
1.2.1 Power Control
The problem of power control in CDMA cellular system has been studied by a number
of researchers [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. In the power control game, the players
are the cellular telephone users in the cell. Each player’s action is to choose the
power level. The player’s utility is modeled as an increasing function of SINR and a
decreasing function of power. By increasing power, the user can increase her SINR,
however, it may require others to increase their own power to maintain the desired
SINR. Thus, once modeled as a one-stage game, this game has a unique inefficient
Nash equilibrium, where every user increases the power level as high as possible, and
in the end everyone suffers.
However, once consider the same game played repeatedly, it is possible to punish
the selfish users, who increase the power to a level that significantly impairs others’
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SINR. Initially, all the users are assumed to start with a proper power level, which is
reported by the base station at the beginning of each slot. If a user deviates from that
strategy, all others will punish the user by increasing their power levels to the values
in the inefficient equilibrium. In this case, if the user’s objective is to maximize her
utility over many stages of the game, and if the game has an infinite time horizon, the
threat of retaliation leads to a Pareto efficient equilibrium, where no one will deviate
from the optimal power level.
The problem in this approach, and all the other approaches using repeated game
models, is that it depends on the users’ rationalities and the assumption that each user
has full knowledge of the other users’ strategies, utility functions and so on. Without
the complete knowledge of other users, a user cannot predict that once he/she deviates
the given strategy, the other users will punish him/her and thus in the end he/she
cannot gain from this deviation. Also without rationality, the user may still insist to
deviate from the current strategy, although he/she knows that he/she will suffer from
this decision. And in practice, it is difficult to guarantee that each user can have the
full knowledge of the others; and also human behaviors are rarely completely rational.
So although this study generates some very meaningful theoretical results, still it has
very limited market in practice.
1.2.2 Selfish Routing
Selfish routing is also well studied by many researchers, using game theory model
[15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. In this problem, a network and a number of users are
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given. Each user needs to transfer a rate of traffic from a source node to a destination
node, and several routes are available between source and destination. The latency
function for each edge is also provided, specifying the time needed to traverse the
edge given its congestion. The objective of this problem is to properly route all the
traffic such that the sum of all travel times, i.e., the total latency, is minimized. This
seems a simple optimization problem, which can be easily solved by some optimization
algorithm and get the optimal assignment. However, in practice it is too expensive
or may be impossible to have a central authority to regulate all the network traffic
according to the optimal assignment.
Therefore, without the central regulation and control, each user is only interested
in finding the minimum latency path and transfer the traffics on the chosen paths.
Each user chooses the path based on the current network congestion state. We call
this a selfishly motivated assignment of traffic to paths, which normally will not
minimize the total latency. Hence, the lack of regulation lead to the decreased network
performance. In [18], the authors quantify the degradation in network performance
due to unregulated traffic. They prove that if the latency of each edge is a linear
function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network
users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency. If the latency is a
general function, assumed to be continuous and nondecreasing in the edge congestion,
the total latency of the routes chosen by unregulated selfish network users is no more
than twice of the total latency incurred by optimally routing.
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1.2.3 Cooperation in Ad Hoc Networks
In ad hoc networks, each node acts not only as source/destination for traffic, but also
as a router to forward packets for its neighbors. What are the incentives for nodes to
cooperate in such environments, particularly when there may be natural disincentives
such as increased energy consumptions? As shown in [22, 23], if all the nodes behave
selfishly, i.e., nodes are only interests in their own benefits and frequently reject others’
packets to save energy, everyone will suffer on the throughput. In other words, selfish
behavior by nodes will lead to a suboptimal equilibrium (not Pareto optimal) and
undesirable steadily state. Therefore, incentive mechanisms are required to lead nodes
towards constructive behaviors and a desirable equilibrium. Incentive mechanisms are
broadly divided into two categories based on their techniques: credit-based systems
and reputation-based systems.
1.2.3.1 Credit-based System
In this scheme, a node is rewarded for cooperating with the other nodes and is charged
when requesting service from others. One way of implementing the charge and reward
scheme is by introducing “virtual currency” as in [24, 25, 26]. In this method each
node is rewarded with “tokens” for providing service, which are then used by the
node for seeking services from others. One criticism of this method is that it requires
a tamper-proof hardware module to prevent nodes from cheating during “token”
exchange.
So in order to avoid using tamper-proof hardware and also prevent nodes cheating,
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some algorithmic mechanism designs are provided in [27, 28, 29, 30, 31] to guarantee
the truthful reporting and enforce the nodes’ cooperation. For example, in [27],
system uses a Credit Clearance Service (CCS) to store and manage the nodes’ credits.
Each sender is charged by CCS once the packet is successfully transmitted and each
forwarder is awarded by CCS through sending CCS the receipt, showing that they
help others forwarding packets. All the payments and charges are properly designed
to make sure that nodes will not cheat with CCS, e.g., earn credits but not forward
the packets, receive the packets but not claim to CCS to avoid credits payment, so
on and on.
In addition, in [32], the authors considered a market-based approach to stimulate
the cooperation in ad hoc networks, where nodes charge a price for relaying packets.
They assume that nodes set prices to maximize their own net benefit, and character-
ize the equilibria of the resulting market (so called market equilibrium). They also
propose an iterative algorithm for the nodes to adapt their price and rate allocation,
and study its convergence behavior.
1.2.3.2 Reputation-based System
Another technique for creating incentives is in the form of reputation. Each node
gains reputation through providing services to others. Each node builds a posi-
tive reputation by cooperating with others and is tagged as “misbehaving” other-
wise. The nodes that gain a bad reputation are then isolated from the network over
time. Several reputation mechanisms can be found in the recent literature (such as
in [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39]). Game theory has been used in [33] for the analysis
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of a reputation exchange mechanism. According to this mechanism, a node assigns
reputation values to its neighbors based on its direct interactions with them and on
indirect reputation information obtained from other nodes. Further, this reputation
mechanism is modeled as a complex node strategy in a repeated game model. The
analysis of the game helps to assess the robustness of the reputation scheme against
different node strategies and derive conditions for cooperation.
There exist other mechanisms that do not involve any logical object (reputation,
virtual currency) in inducing an optimal equilibrium. This includes the generous tit-
for-tat mechanism (GTFT) [40], where the GTFT technique is employed as a node
strategy in a repeated game for forwarding packets. For example, node A will forward
packets from node B, if node B helps node A to forward packets, vice versa. Some
conditions are derived for GTFT to achieve a socially optimal Nash equilibrium.
1.3 Motivation
From the previous work, we understood how to properly apply game theory in net-
working issues, and at the same time we found several research gaps in this field.
1.3.1 Distributed Behaviors
Most of previous work focus on the users’ selfish behaviors in the networks, since game
theory is known to study the interactions between selfish players. Not many people
studied the “distributed behaviors” in the wireless networks, i.e., the behaviors caused
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Figure 1.1: The inefficient result caused by distributed behaviors
the conflicts in decision making, even if all the nodes in the network share the same
objective. We use a simple coverage problem in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) to
illustrate this point. In WSNs, a large number of energy constrained sensor nodes
are randomly deployed in a target field to monitor some activities in this area. Since
all the sensor nodes can be pre-programmed by the same organization, they can be
designed to achieve the same global objective, e.g., accurately monitor the target field
and last for as long as possible. In WSNs, this is done through cleverly scheduling the
sensor nodes and let each node be alternatively awake and sleep. In the decentralized
and multiform WSNs, each node is preferred to be self-organized, i.e., make decisions
(e.g., sleep or awake) distributively without relying on a base station or sink node.
At this point, each node may simply make decision based on some local information,
e.g., each node may choose the time slot to be awake, when most of its neighbors are
sleeping. The same as selfish behaviors, distributed behaviors may also lead to the
inefficient result. A simple example is shown in Figure 1.1. In this simple network
with four nodes (A,B,C and D) and two time slots, the distributed behaviors may
lead to the inefficient solution, where node A and C are awake in slot 1, and node
B and D are awake in slot 2. In this solution, no one will choose to change to the
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other slot, because that will cause to be awake together with two neighbors instead
of the current only one. So here although all the nodes share the same objective
(e.g., maximize the coverage), restricted by the local information, they still end up in
an inefficient solution. In other words, the inefficiency does not come from the fact
that each user is selfish and only considers its own benefit, instead, each sensor node
is willing to cooperate with the others to achieve the global objective, but each one
can only make decision based on its local information. These limited perspectives
may cause the decision-making conflicts and finally the inefficient result. Therefore,
it is quite interesting to study the interactions between the distributed nodes in the
network using game theory.
In addition, we would like to mention that with the technology growth, the selfish
behaviors in the network is gradually decreasing, since many human roles now can
be replaced by the intelligent devices, e.g., sensor nodes, robot, etc. These intelligent
devices can be totally controlled by the engineers to enforce them cooperate together
and achieve the same global objective. However, with the current trends of wireless
network toward decentralized and self-organized networks, the distributed behaviors
are becoming prevalent and more preferred by the network designers. Therefore, it
will be quite meaningful to study the distributed behaviors in the wireless networks
and provide insightful points of view for the future network design.
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1.3.2 Optimality and Complexity of Equilibrium
With more and more works applying game theory, especially the Nash equilibrium,
in the networking study, it naturally becomes an important problem to investigate,
how well Nash equilibrium can achieve and how long it takes to converge to Nash
equilibrium, i.e., the optimality and complexity of Nash equilibrium.
We talk about the optimality first. Some previous work studied the optimality of
Nash equilibrium in selfish routing [18] and obtained some lower bounds of network
performance degradation due to selfish behaviors. We are wondering what will happen
for the users’ distributed behaviors. Is it possible that through some properly design,
we can let the equilibrium solution become the optimal solution? After all, in WSNs or
some similar pervasive computing systems, the sensor nodes can be totally controlled
by the designer and thus in some extent we can enforce any utility function on each
sensor node and program the devices to act according to the designed protocols. For
example, in Figure 1.1, we can configure each sensor node to choose the slot with the
least number of awaken neighbors, or we can also let each sensor node choose the slot,
where it has the least overlapped area with the neighbors. A big difference between
the distributed nodes and the selfish users is that we can decide the utility function
of each distributed node, but for selfish user we cannot. Therefore, it is really a very
interesting topic and a meaningful study to investigate whether it is possible to make
the Nash equilibrium an efficient solution through properly configuring the utility
function? If not, how much network performance degradation will be caused by the
distributed behaviors?.
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Then, we consider the equilibrium convergence and complexity issue. We know
that Nash equilibrium can be computed based on the fixed point theorem, once all the
players’ utility functions are known in a central server. However, in the current de-
centralized wireless networks, centralized base station is not preferred and most tasks
are required to be done by the self-organized nodes, which behave distributively and
adjust decisions accordingly with the local information updates. Thus, it is impor-
tant to know whether users can converge to the equilibrium through some distributed
protocols and how long it takes to achieve equilibrium? Previous convergence stud-
ies focused on users’ selfish behaviors or market pricing scenarios, and here we are
interested in the upcoming decentralized network with distributed nodes and would
like to investigate whether the network can converge to a equilibrium with properly
configured utility functions and local updating protocols? Moreover, to make these
designs applicable in the real industry, the complexity analysis is also very important.
Especially in WSNs, a solution will not have any value, if it let the nodes spend too
much time and energy on searching and converging to the desired equilibrium. In
this case, the nodes will not have enough energy for the real tasks.
Regarding the Nash equilibrium convergence, the book [41] gives a good introduc-
tion and discussion of these issues. Especially, in the recent years, the computational
complexity theorists made a lot progresses on studying the complexity of finding
Nash equilibrium, the details are shown in Chapter 2. With the help of these useful
theoretical results, we are looking forward to obtain some meaningful results for the
equilibrium convergence problem we studied in the wireless networks.
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1.3.3 Incentivizing Cooperation
Previously many researchers studied the cooperation incentivizing mechanisms in ad
hoc networks and obtained a lot of interesting results, however,until now few results
have been turned into the commodities, or have the real impacts on our way of using
wireless network today. The possible reasons may come from both the ad hoc network
itself and the impractical designs of the previous solutions.
Firstly, we talk about the ad hoc networks. With so many years’ massive efforts
in researches and developments, ad hoc networks still have not yet witnessed mass
market deployment, instead, only have some military or specialized civilian applica-
tions. As discussed in [42], the reasons may come from the fact that for the common
users, few of them are interested in forming an ad hoc network for sharing some in-
formation, instead, for them, accessing to the internet are much more interesting. In
this case, users are looking for multipurpose networking platforms in which cost is an
issue, Internet is a must and high bandwidth is preferred. So recently a more practical
“opportunistic ad hoc networking” is provided in [43], known as “Mesh Networks”.
Mesh networks are built on a mix of fixed access points (e.g., WiFi access points) and
mobile nodes interconnected via wireless links to form a multi-hop ad hoc network.
Thus, Mesh networks can inherit many results from ad hoc network research, and
at the same time can be conveniently simulated and implemented in the real test
beds, e.g., in the community WiFi networks. In this case, it has been possible to
verify the suitability of this technology (“Mesh Networks”) for civilian applications
and stimulate users interest in adopting it. Recently the single hop mesh network,
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so-called wireless community networks (WCNs), have already shown great potential
in the wireless market. WCNs are built mainly on 802.11 technology (WiFi) and
aim at providing Internet access to a community of users that can share the same
Internet access link. Some examples of this are Seattle Wireless [44], Champaign-
Urbana Community Wireless Network (CUWiN)[45], San Francisco BAWUG [46],
the Roofnet system at MIT (MIT Roofnet) [47] and even some commercial compnay,
e.g., FON [48] and Whisher[49].
Although WCNs attract a lot of attentions, up to now the existing solutions
rarely consider the cooperation incentivizing schemes in WCNs. So we would like to
investigate this scheme in WCNs. We know that in WCNs, only WiFi access points
act as the packets forwarders and all the users only act as source or destination nodes
to send or receive packets under different access points. Does it mean that there will
not exist any selfish behaviors in WCNs, since WiFi access points can be properly
programmed to do the right things? The answer is no, the selfish behaviors still
exist in WCNs, because each WiFi access point is totally controlled by each user
who subscribed it and the users can make any configurations they like to benefit
themselves the most. Therefore, the cooperation incentivizing mechanism is indeed
required in WCNs. Moreover, this scheme should address the different features of
WCNs, compared with the one in ad hoc networks. For example, in WCNs there is
only one intermediate relaying node (the WLAN AP), which is also connected to a
fixed power supply and to the Internet; and in WCNs the functions of provider and
consumer are split: APs are providing service and mobile users are consuming service;
so on and on. Furthermore, we would like to have the cooperation mechanism be a
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practical design which can be turned into real products, since WCNs mainly target to
the civilian applications. In this case, the common users’ preferences should be well
considered. For example, a pure software solution normally is more easily accepted
by the common users, than the hardware involved solutions. A payment balanced
solution, where users earn credits through contributing WiFi and spend credits when
consuming others’ WiFi and no real money involved, should be preferred by most
users, since it really does not make a lot sense to ask a user paying real money for
WiFi service in a WiFi sharing community. Therefore, cooperation in WCNs is a
very practical and challenging topic, we would like to investigate this problem and
generate some implementable results.
1.4 Contributions
As discussed above, motivated from the previous work, we studied the following issues
in this thesis: (1) applying game theory to investigate the distributed behaviors in the
WSNs; (2) designing a practical cooperation incentivizing mechanism for the WCNs.
Specifically, we made the following contributions in this thesis:
• First, we analyze the optimality and complexity of the pure Nash equilibrium
in the coverage game. We prove that the ratio between the optimal coverage
and the worst case Nash equilibrium coverage is upper bounded by 2 − 1
m+1
,
where m is the maximum number of nodes, which cover any point, in the Nash
equilibrium solution. We prove that finding the pure Nash equilibrium in the
general coverage game is PLS-complete, i.e. as hard as that of finding a local
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optimum in any local search problem with efficient computable neighbors.
• Next, we theoretically configure the pricing and punishment mechanisms in
WiFi sharing community network and analyze the user and system behaviors.
We prove that under our punishment mechanism, no one has incentive to cheat
and all the rational users will converge to Pareto efficient equilibrium in a long
run.
• Moreover, we theoretically configure a priority pricing system to solve the fair-
ness issue in the credit-based system. Under this design, we prove that all the
users will choose proper priority according to their incomes and demands, all
the users’ utility are maximized, and the whole system converge to the Pareto
efficient market equilibrium.
1.5 Thesis overview
First, we study the coverage problem in wireless sensor networks, using game theory
model. We formulate the problem as a game, prove the game convergence to Nash
equilibrium and then analyze the optimality and complexity of equilibrium. The re-
sults are also further validated by extensive simulations. The special part here is that
all the sensor nodes in the networks are not selfish players, instead, they all share the
same objective, maximizing the network coverage under a fixed lifetime requirement.
However, constrained by their distributed behaviors, their decision making processes
share a lot of similarities as the selfish players. That is why the game theory is applied
here. At the same time, the distributed behaviors also have some unique features,
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which generate some unique results in this game. This work is presented in Chapter 3.
Next, we provide a practical scheme incentivizing cooperation in WCNs. This
solution is a pure software solution and no hardware modifications required. In this
case, the central server is not guaranteed to get the complete information of the users’
behaviors, thus a monitoring and punishment mechanism is provided to prevent users’
cheating behaviors. We formulate the problem as a game and prove that all the
rational played users will converge to a Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium. The results
are also validated by extensive experiments and the real life trace data. We would like
to mention that this cooperation mechanism is totally different from all the previous
cooperation mechanism in ad hoc network, due to the different network features and
the unique practical considerations. We present this work in chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, we provide a priority pricing mechanism to solve the fairness prob-
lem in the credit-based WiFi sharing systems, introduced in chapter 4. The credit-
based system, either in ad hoc network or WCNs, always has the fairness problem,
i.e., some users can earn a lot of credits and cannot spend them all; while others can
only earn a few credits and cannot obtain enough service. In the previous work, to
solve this problem, the previous researchers mostly assume that users can pay real
money to buy some credits if they do not have enough credits. However, this assump-
tion rarely make any sense in practice. The WCNs are built on the users’ interests on
sharing their WiFi with others and at the same time obtain the FREE service from
others, so most people are not interested in paying real money to obtain the network
service from others. In one sense, it is not practical to design a real money involved
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WiFi sharing system, instead, a system with payment totally balanced by credits (or
any other virtual currency) is required. Based on this idea, we provide a Priority
Pricing in the WCNs, differentiate users’ service requirements and almost guarantee
100% demand fullfilled for all the users in the community.
A brief introduction on game theory and Nash equilibrium is given in Chapter 2.
We focus on the part of knowledge related to our research, such as price of anarchy,
Pareto optimality, market equilibrium, PLS-complete and so on. Finally we conclude




Game theory studies the interactions among rational and intelligent players and at-
tempts to mathematically capture players’ behaviors in strategic situations, where a
player’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others’ behaviors. Game
theory is founded by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in the 1944 book,
“Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” [50]. It is initially developed to analyze
competitions in economics, where one individual does better at the others expense
(zero sum games). After that, the studies on game theory were primarily focused on
cooperative game theory, which analyzes optimal strategies for groups of individuals,
presuming that they can enforce agreements on proper strategies. Until 1950s, John
Nash provided Nash equilibrium [51] and non cooperative game [52], which assumes
that each player is selfish and intelligent, trying to get as much payoff as possible in the
game. Nash equilibrium is a state, where every player is satisfied with their current
strategies given all the others do not change their strategies. Nash equilibrium can
be regarded as a milestone in game theory history, since it makes it possible to study
a much wider variety of games and allows for analysis of both non cooperative and
cooperative games. Since then, in the past decades, game theory has been expanded
to more fields beyond economics, including biology, engineering, political science, in-
ternational relations, computer science, and even philosophy. The game players are
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also not restriced to human beings, computers and any artificially intelligent device
can be regarded as players.
In this chapter, we provide some game theory preliminaries and researches related
to our study. Firstly, in section 2.1, we introduce the strategic game model and Nash
equilibrium. Then, in section 2.2 and 2.3, we provide the recent studies on the
optimality and complexity of Nash equilibrium respectively. Finally, in section 2.4
we conclude this chapter.
2.1 Strategic Game Model and Nash Equilibrium
A strategic game involves a finite number of players, denoted as player set I =
{1, . . . , n}, and each player i has a finite number of strategies to choose from, denoted
as strategy set Si for each player i. The game is played by having all the players
simultaneously pick their individual strategies from their own strategy set. This set
of choices results in a strategy profile s = {s1, . . . , sn,∀si ∈ Si}, called the outcome
of the game and all the possible strategy profiles constitute the strategy space of this
game, denoted as S. Over any strategy profile s ∈ S, each player has a payoff, called
payoff function,denoted as Pi(s1, . . . , sn) for each player i, or Pi(si, s−i) for simplicity,
here s−i means the strategies of all the other players except player i. Each player
i’s payoff function is determined not only by his own strategy but also all the other
players’ strategies.
Furthermore, in game theory we assume that all the players are rational and each
one only chooses a strategy which maximizes his expected payoff given his beliefs
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about what strategies the other players will choose. In game theory this strategy is
called the best response and is defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 We say that a strategy s∗i ∈ Si for player i is a best response, given
the strategies of the other players s−i ∈ S−i if
∀s′i ∈ Si, Pi(s∗i , s−i) > Pi(s′i, s−i) (2.1)
Finally, when all players correctly forecast the other players’ strategies, and play best
response to their forecasts, the resulting strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium, defined
as below:
Definition 2.2 A Nash Equilibrium of a strategic-form game is a strategy profile
s∗ ∈ S such that every player is playing a best response to the strategy choices of the
other players. More formally, we say that s∗ is a Nash Equilibrium if
∀i ∈ I, ∀s′i ∈ Si, Pi(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ Pi(s′i, s∗−i) (2.2)
Nash equilibrium has been justified as representing a stable self-enforcing agreement,
because each player can not obtain more payoff by unilaterally deviating from Nash
Equilibrium and choose any other strategies.
2.1.1 An example: Prisoner’s Dilemma
We use the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma[53] to give an example of strategic game and
Nash equilibrium. The game is summarized in Table 2.1.
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Prisoner B Stays Silent Prisoner B Betrays
Prisoner A Stays Silent Each serves 6 months Prisoner A: 10 years
Prisoner B: goes free
Prisoner A Betrays Prisoner A: goes free Each serves 5 years
Prisoner B: 10 years
Table 2.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate −1,−1 −5, 0
Defect 0,−5 −2,−2
Table 2.2: Payoff Matrix in Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this game, there are two players and each one has two strategies: betray (also
known as Defect) and stay silent (also known as Cooperate). Let us say if the palyer
goes free, his payoff is 0; if the player gets 6 months sentence, his payoff is -1; if the
player gets 5 years sentence, his payoff is -2; and if the player gets 10 years sentence,
his payoff is -5. We obtain the players’ payoff matrix in Table 2.2.
The two players are demonstrated as column player and row player respectively. In
each cell, the first number is the column player’s payoff and the second number is
the row player’s payoff. Clearly, for each player, whatever strategies the other player
chooses, the best response is always the strategy “Defect”. Therefore, the only Nash
equilibrium in this game is that both users choose “Defect”. Obviously, this is not the
best outcome for the players. They both can be better off by choosing “Cooperate”
together. However, since each player only considers to maximize his own payoff, they
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thus end up with this inefficient solution.
This comes the question on Nash equilibrium’s optimality, whether Nash equilib-
rium can provide the optimal solution? We discuss this issue in the following section.
2.2 Optimality
As mentioned in Prisoner’s Dilemma, selfish users are only trying to maximize their
own benefits without necessarily caring the global objective of the underlying game,
e.g., the overall social utility or the overall satisfaction of agents. How can we balance
the players’ benefits and the whole society’s utility in a game? So it is important to
understand the relationship between the players’ own benefits and the global benefit,
and figure out how much does the society suffer by the lack of coordination between
players? We demonstrate this issue through the following two concepts: price of
anarchy and Pareto optimality.
2.2.1 Price of Anarchy
Price of Anarchy (PoA) is defined as the ratio of the optimal social utility and the
worst Nash equilibrium utility, in fact a bound for the amount of loss to a society
due to the lack of coordination. This concept is firstly provided by Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou in [54]. In that work, they also compute the PoA on a simple
un-splittable flow games, which has parallel links between two vertexes. They make
the social utility related to the maximum latency over all edges, i.e., the lower the
maximum latency, the larger the social utility, and they study the m parallel links
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and m players case. For the symmetric case, i.e., all the links have the same speed,
they proposed the upper bound 3 + 4
√
4m lnm for the price of anarchy. This result




for this m parallel links and m players symmetric case. For the asymmetric case,
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [54], proved that the price of anarchy increases in





Since it seems more reasonable to relate the social utility to the sum of delay, later
in [56] Awerbuch et al. considered general networks with polynomial latency functions
and considered the total latency as the social utility function. For the polynomial
of degree d, they prove an upperbound O(2ddd+1) and a lower bound Ω(dd/2) for the
price of anarchy.
Moreover, in [57], Monderer et al. generalize the un-splittable flow problem to the
finite congestion games. In this game players are allowed to pick single edges instead
of a whole path. All the edges are a set of facilities and each facility is associate
with a cost function. Each player’s action is choosing a set of facilities. The social
utility is either related to the sum of player’s costs, or the maximum of players’ costs.
Let us say a game is symmetric if all the cost functions are equal and asymmetric,
otherwise. In [58] Christodoulou and Koutsoupias also studied the price of anarchy
for finite congestion games for both symmetric and asymmetric cases, both linear and
polynomial latency functions. The results are listed in Table 2.3.
Finally we would like to mention that in [59], Adrian Vetta defines a broad class
of games called valid utility systems and proves that their price of anarchy is at
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Linear Latencies Polynomial Latencies










n) dθ(d) Ω(nd/(d+1)), O(n)
Table 2.3: The price of anarchy on finite congestion games
most 2.0, i.e., any Nash equilibrium yields a social utility at least half as much as
the optimal social utility. A wide range of games fall in the category of valid utility
systems. Examples are market sharing games [60], distributed caching games [61],
coverage games [62] and also the facility location games, and selfish routing game we
mentioned above. Therefore, basically for this kind of game, PoA upper bounded by
2.0 seems a trivial result. However, to demonstrate a non-trivial PoA smaller than
2.0, it may require a deep understanding of the given game and dig out some special
features of the game.
2.2.2 Pareto Optimality
Unlike social utility, Pareto optimality is not concerned with the sum of players’ util-
ities or the maximum utility. Instead, it characterizes the strategy profiles which
cannot be strictly improved “componentwise”. We firstly provide the formal defini-
tion, and then we will demonstrate the relationship between Pareto optimality and
equilibrium solutions.
In a game with a set of players I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, given a strategy profile s =
{s1, . . . , sn,∀si ∈ Si}, a change from one strategy profile to another that can make
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at least one player better off without making any other player worse off is called a
Pareto improvement. A strategy profile is Pareto optimal or Pareto efficient when no
further Pareto improvements can be made. Formally defined as:
Definition 2.3 A strategy profile sˆ ∈ S of a strategic-form game is Pareto optimal,
if no further Pareto improvements can be made, i.e., the strategy profile s′ satisfying
the following constrains does not exist,
∀s′ ∈ S, s′ 6= sˆ, ∀i ∈ I, Pi(s′i, s′−i) ≥ Pi(sˆi, sˆ−i) at least one of these inequalities is strict
(2.3)
According to Definition 2.3, clearly the Nash equilibrium (both “Defect”) in Pris-
oner’s Dilemma2.2 is not Pareto Optimal, since there exists another solution (both
“Cooperate”), under which both users are better off. This famous example demon-
strates the social loss from players’ selfish behaviors.
However, there does exist the scenario, where the equilibrium solution is Pareto
optimal. That is the famous Walrasian Equilibrium, provided by Walras in [63], also
known as competitive equilibrium and market equilibrium.
Here we give an introduction of the market and competitive equilibrium, the de-
tails can refer to [64]. In the market, initially each player is endowed with some
amount of each of k goods. Player i has initial endowments ωi = (ωi1, . . . , ω
i
k). Sup-
pose the price of good j is pj, so the monetary value of the player’s endowment is






i) subject to p>xi ≤ p>ωi (2.4)
here ui(x
i) is the player’s utility for the bundle of goods xi, i.e., a set of goods player i
prefers. We can denote the solution point by xi(p, p>ωi), since each player’s preferred
bundle of goods, is realted to the given price vector p and the initial endowment’s
monetary value p>ωi. Then, we can say that (x, p) is a Walrasian equilibrium from






that means that if there is no excess demand for any good when each player buys
the bundle that is optimal for him given his budget constraint. It can be proved
that for any initial endowments ω there always exists a Walrasian equilibrium for
some price vector p. That is, there is some p at which markets clear. In fact, this
p can be found by a tatonnement mechanism[65]. The Walrasian equilibrium is also
called competitive equilibrium, since it is reached as players compete for goods, which
become allocated to those players who value them most. Once we assume that all
utilities are increasing and concave, p is certainly nonnegative and the inequalities
in equation 2.4 and 2.5 are to be equalities at the equilibrium. This is the famous
Arrow-Debreu model [66] [67].
Theorem 2.1 Under some technical but reasonable assumptions about the utility ui,
there is always a price vector p called the price equilibrium such that the market





i. This is so called market equilibrium, or competitive equilibrium.
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At this point, we would like to introduce the relationship between competitive
equilibrium and Pareto optimality. This is concluded in the two fundamental theo-
rems of welfare economics [64], which state that the Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto
efficient and for any Pareto efficient allocation, there exists a p such that (ω, p) is
a competitive equilibrium. The inherent idea is simple. In competitive equilibrium,
the whole market clears, i.e., the total demand is equal to the total supply. And
since each player chooses the bundle of goods, maximizing their utility, the goods can
go to the players who value them most. In this case, it is impossible for any other
solution, not equilibrium solution, to strictly improve all the players’ utilities, thus
the equilibrium is Pareto optimal and vice versa.
2.3 Complexity
Since 1950s, when Nash showed every finite game has an equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies, i.e., Nash equilibrium [51, 52], many researchers have approached to the problem
of finding a Nash equilibrium. Meanwhile, in the past decades, the computational
complexity theory [68] also witnessed tremendous growth. However, the mainstream
concepts, e.g., NP-completeness, are not directly applicable for the complexity of find-
ing Nash equilibrium. Since Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, NP-completeness
seems focusing more on demonstrating the difficulties of problems, where a solution
may not exist. Therefore, combining these two topics together, in 1991, Meggido
and Papadimitriou defined the complexity class TFNP (“NP total functions”) in [69],
which consists exactly of all search problems in NP for which every instance is guaran-
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teed to have a solution. Clearly, NASH (“the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium”)
belongs to TFNP.
Later in [70], to solve the problems in TFNP, Papadimitriou constructed an ex-
ponentially large graph, where each node denotes a possible solution and each edge
denotes the move from one solution to another solution according to some algorithm.
Then, any problem in TFNP, is equivalent to start from a source node and moves
to one of the neighbor nodes according to some algorithm until reaching at a sink
node (i.e., the equilibrium solution). Since the solution of any problem in TFNP
is guaranteed to exist, the sink node’s existence should also be guaranteed. This is
done by applying some simple graph-theoretic lemmas. According to different graph
structures, the problems in TFNP can be grouped into several complete classes.
In [70, 71, 72], Papadimitriou et al. studied three important complete classes,
PLS, PPA and PPAD respectively. Their graph structures, the source and sink nodes,
and the corresponding lemma applied to guarantee the convergence are as shown in
Table 2.4 and 2.5.
Class Graph Source Sink
PLS class[71] directed acyclic graph node with in-degree zero node with outdegree zero
PPA class[70] undirected graph node with odd-degree another node with odd-degree
PPAD class[72] directed graph unbalanced node1 another unbalanced node
Table 2.4: The complete classes of TFNP problems
Specifically, PLS class includes most famous local search problem, e.g., the well-
known Kernighan-Lin algorithm for graph partitioning is PLS-complete. The PPA
30
Class Lemma
PLS class [71] “every finite directed acyclic graph has a sink”.
PPA class [70] “once with one odd-degree node,there must be another odd-degree node”
PPAD class [72] “once with one unbalanced node 2, there must be another unbalanced node.”
Table 2.5: The complete classes of TFNP problems
class includes many important combinatorial problems. However, none of them are
know to be complete. PPAD class includes NASH, Brouwer’s fixed point problem,
etc. In [72], Papadimitriou et al. also proved that NASH is PPAD-complete, and
this holds even for games with three players, and for graphical games[73]. Thus, a
polynomial-time algorithm for these problems would imply a polynomial algorithm
for any complete problem in this class, e.g., computing Brouwer fixed points. In
addition, we would like to mention that some NASH problems with special payoff
functions can be regarded as local search problem and proved to be PLS complete
[62], however, for the general NASH problems, it is proved to be PPAD complete.
Basically, current research mostly create some kinds of complete classes and prove
that NASH has the equal complexity as some famous difficult problems. Moreover, the
complexity of NASH is not only related to the problem itself, but also the algorithm
applied. Thus, even Fabrikant et al. in [74] showed for their NASH problem (a proved
PLS-complete problem), needs at least exponential time to converge in the worst case.
It may still be possible, that if applying some other algorithms, that problem can be
solved in polynomial time. Therefore, until now it is still an open question whether
Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we gave a brief introduction on strategic game and Nash equilibrium,
and also we surveyed the previous work related on the equilibrium analysis. As far as
we know, it is still an open research issue to study the optimality and complexity of
Nash equilibrium, and few well accepted results or general approaches are available.
Therefore, for us to analyze the Nash equilibrium in the studied problem, we should,
on one hand, try to apply as many existing results as possible, and on the other




Coverage Game in Wireless Sensor
Networks
After the introduction of game theory and Nash equilibrium in Chapter 2, in this
chapter we apply game theoretical methods in wireless sensor networks and study the
coverage and scheduling issue.
3.1 Introduction
In the last few years, there has been tremendous interest in the field of wireless sensor
networks. The vision is to embed small, cheap and consequently fault prone sensor
nodes in the physical world to monitor various events and phenomena of interest. The
applications of these networks range from habitat monitoring to defense applications,
such as monitoring of enemy troop movements.
The primary goal of a sensor network is to monitor a sensing field effectively,
i.e., cover the entire field, so that the probability of an event or phenomenon going
undetected is very small. Clearly this can be achieved by carefully deploying a large
number of sensors over the field, so that every point in the field is covered by at least
one sensor. Unfortunately, in several applications, it is expected that such planned
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deployment is infeasible and consequently sensors will have to be scattered randomly
in order to monitor the field.
The second issue is that of energy. Sensors are powered by batteries, which can
last for a finite duration of time. Therefore, in order to avoid constant, expensive
and possibly hazardous redeployment of sensors over a field, it is critical that once
deployed, the sensors are alive for a long duration. Clearly, the first objective of
providing high quality coverage and the second objective of a long network lifetime
are at odds with each other.
A strategy that is commonly employed to achieve these conflicting goals is to
over-provision the network and schedule only a few nodes to be awake at any given
point of time, so that network lifetime is extended without compromising on the
coverage requirements. The key challenge is to design scheduling algorithms, which
are distributed and based on only local information, which achieve near optimal
performance. In this work, we consider what is known as the set covers problem in
order to trade-off between lifetime and coverage. In the set covers problem, each
node in the network belongs to one of the sets, called a cover set. At any given time,
only one among these sets is active, i.e., all nodes in this set are awake, while the
remaining nodes are asleep to conserve energy. Intuitively, for a given deployment of
nodes, as the number of covers increases, the lifetime of the network improves at the
expense of coverage performance.
Prior research on the set covers problem has taken two approaches. In the first, the
question posed is, what is the maximum possible number of covers (or lifetime) which
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achieves a minimum coverage requirement C [75, 76, 77]? In the second approach,
the question posed is, what is the maximum coverage C possible for a given lifetime
guarantee K [78]? In this work, we take the latter approach and devise a distributed
algorithm which achieves near optimal coverage performance, for a given lifetime
guarantee K. As stated in [78], this approach is more natural since it might be
impossible to provide a minimum coverage guarantee in every cover set when there
is an in-homogeneous distribution of nodes. Moreover, in [78], the authors show that
this set K-cover problem is NP-complete.
In this work, we address the issue of designing an approximation algorithm for
the K-cover problem. Specifically our design goals are as follows:
• Near Optimal: Our goal is to design an algorithm which achieves close to
optimal performance, i.e for a given K, the coverage provided is close to the
optimal coverage achievable.
• Distributed: Clearly, the optimal solution depends on the topology of the
network. However, since sensor nodes are resource constrained, we wish to
design an algorithm where a node takes decisions independently, based purely
on local information obtained from its neighbors.
• Scalable: The greedy distributed algorithm proposed in [78] scales linearly
with the number of nodes N . For a sensor network, N could be arbitrarily
large, therefore our goal is to design an algorithm which scales sub-linearly
with N .
• Robust: Since in wireless network, packets are possibly collided with each
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other or lost because of environment noise, our goal is to design an algorithm,
which can adapt to the practical noisy environment.
• Asynchronous: Maintaining tight clock synchronization in a sensor network
is a challenging task. Therefore, our algorithm must work well, even if decisions
by individual sensors are made out of synchrony.
In this work, we pose the coverage game to achieve our stated design goals.
The coverage game is inspired by both graphical games [79] and potential games
[57]. Specifically, we regard each node as a game player and the K covers as K
strategies for each node. The payoff of a node i is the area covered by i alone and no
other nodes in the same cover set. We show that in this coverage game the optimal
solution constitutes a pure Nash equilibrium [51]. We then design the synchronous
and asynchronous Nash equilibria Convergence Algorithms (SNECA and ANECA)
respectively, in which nodes change their cover set choices, based on the cover set
choices of their neighbors. We analytically prove that in both SNECA and ANECA
the coverage performances strictly increase and converge to pure Nash equilibria. We
then analyze the optimality of Nash equilibria and prove that the ratio, between
optimal coverage and the worst case Nash equilibria coverage, is smaller than two.
Moreover, we regard Nash equilibria as the local optimal solutions, SNECA and
ANECA as local search algorithms and then we study the complexity of finding Nash
equilibria. We prove the PLS (Polynomial Local Search)-completeness [71] of finding
Nash equilibria in the coverage game. It means that our problem is “as difficult as that
of finding a local optimum in any local search problem with efficiently computable
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neighborhoods” and in the worst case, we may need exponential time to converge.
Finally, through the extensive simulations we shown that the worse cases mentioned
in the analysis rarely happen in practice. Normally, both SNECA and ANECA can
converge to Nash equilibria quickly and efficiently improve the network coverage. The
coverage performance of Nash equilibria is close to the optimal coverage.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the
related work in the area and how our approach differs from the literature. In Section
3.3, we state our assumptions, problem definition, and the coverage game formula-
tion. In Section 3.4, we describe the synchronous and asynchronous Nash equilibria
convergence algorithms and prove the convergence. In Section 3.5, we theoretically
analyze the optimality and complexity of pure Nash equilibria in the coverage game.
In Section 3.6, we evaluate the performance and the complexity of Nash equilibria in
the coverage game via extensive simulations. Finally, we make some conclusions in
Section 3.7.
3.2 Related Work
Most research in the area of wireless sensor networks on the set covers problem is based
on maximizing the number of covers subject to a coverage requirement. This is called
the Maximum Set Covers problem. In [76], the authors proved that the Maximum
Set Covers problem is NP-complete. They also provide a heuristic to find the cover
sets for full coverage by minimizing the coverage of sparsely covered areas in each
cover selection round. In [75], the authors consider the problem of target monitoring.
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There are a known, finite set of static targets in the field which need to be monitored.
The authors formulate the problem as an optimization problem and they require that
each cover should cover all the targets in the network. They then provide greedy
heuristic algorithms for covering the targets. In [80], the authors derived a tight
upper bound for α-lifetime, i.e., the time duration during which at least α portion of
the surveillance region is covered. Then, in [77] they devised a centralized algorithm,
in which, in each round it seeks a minimal α-cover which maximizes the α-lifetime
upper bound of the remaining set of nodes. Due to the complexity of Maximum Set
Covers problem, all the proposed algorithms are centralized.
In [78] the authors try to maximize the coverage subject to a lifetime require-
ment K, called set K-cover problem. Set K-cover problem is also proved to be
NP-complete. The authors provide three algorithms to solve this problem: (i) ran-
dom algorithm, (ii) distributed greedy algorithm, (iii) global greedy algorithm. In the
random algorithm, each node randomly chooses a cover set. This simple algorithm is
very robust, however, the coverage performance is not very good. In the distributed
algorithm, each node makes its decision sequentially, according to their ID numbers.
A node chooses the cover in which it can maximally increase the total coverage, based
on the decisions of previous nodes. This algorithm is also very simple and can provide
fairly good coverage performance. However, it has several problems. First, each node
only makes a decision once. This decision depends on prior decisions already made by
nodes with smaller IDs. Therefore, the performance of the solution depends on what
order the nodes execute the algorithm. This can result in very poor performance in
low density networks. Second, since the running time is linear in N , the algorithm
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can take a long time to run in large scale networks. Third, the algorithm is not really
based on local information, since each node needs to wait for the decisions made by
all other nodes prior to it. Finally, the algorithm requires synchronization for its
execution.
Our work is inspired by graphical games [73] and the potential game [57]. In
standard game theoretic literature [81], the payoff of a player depends on the strategies
of all the other players in the game. However, in a graphical game, players are
represented as vertexes in a graph. Two vertexes are connected by an edge if and only
if the strategy of one player influences the reward of the other. This notion is especially
applicable to the set K-cover problem. Designing algorithms which converge to Nash
Equilibrium is a challenging problem and has received much attention. In [79], the
authors propose a hill climbing strategy which converges to an approximate Nash
equilibrium. In [82], the authors apply this hill climbing algorithm to solve the set
K-cover problem. However, this algorithm requires a centralized controller to ensure
convergence and can only converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
in potential game [57], there exists a potential function that is strictly increasing after
any local improvement. There is no cycle of local improvements of players, so any
sequence of improvements by players converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. Inspired
by the hill climbing algorithm and the potential game, we design our coverage game
and the corresponding convergence algorithms (SNECA and ANECA), which can be
executed in a purely distributed manner, without the need for a central controller
and converge to pure Nash equilibria.
39
3.3 Problem Definition
We assume that N nodes are randomly scattered in a field of area A 1. Each node
is assigned a hard-coded and unique ID before deployment. Each node has a sensing
range Rs and communication range Rc such that Rc ≥ 2Rs. This assumption is well
justified in literature [83]. We assume that every node knows its location and can
obtain the location of its neighbors through local communication. We assume the
network time is slotted. We assume an event driven application, where the network
traffic is low, i.e., most of the energy consumption of a node is from the sensing task in
the active time. Thus, we assume the energy consumed by a node in a slot when it is
active is a constant es
2. We assume that every node belongs to one of K disjoint sets
and the nodes are scheduled to be active over a schedule of lengthK such that, in each
cover set i, nodes belonging to the cover set i are active. Therefore, the lifetime of the
network is proportional to K. Given such a schedule, our objective is to determine
the optimal K partition of N , such that the average coverage is maximized. For
each node i ∈ N , let si denote the cover set it chooses, i.e, si = j, j = 1, . . . , K, if
i is activated in the cover set j. Then, s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN), represents a partition of
N into K cover sets. Let S be the set of all K-covers possible. Clearly, there are
|S| = KN possible cover sets possible. For each s ∈ S, the coverage Cj(s) of slot
j is given by Cj(s) = | ∪{i:si=j} R〉|, where R〉 is the region covered by node i. Our
1WSNs are widely applied in the hostile environment, where the nodes can not be carefully placed
one by one in the field. In most cases, nodes are randomly scattered in the field by helicopter
2Even if for some other applications, where this assumption does not hold and some nodes may
run out of the energy much earlier than other nodes, the left nodes can discover these node failure
events and adapt in recovery phase. We well studied this unexpected node failure issue in [84].
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objective is the following:




Subject to s ∈ S (3.1)
C(s) is a metric which depends on the topology of the network, K and the sensing
range Rs of the nodes. For a large scale sensor network, clearly a distributed solution
is desired which depends purely on local information possessed by the nodes. We
begin by making the following intuitive observation. For a node i, which has chosen
a cover set si, if all of its sensing region is covered by other nodes which have chosen
the same cover set, then node i is redundant in the cover set i. Therefore, if node i
switches to a cover set where there is some region which is covered by node i alone,
then the coverage performance can only improve. This motivates us to define the
reward or payoff Pi(s) for a node i as:
Pi(s) = |Ri \ ∪{j:sj=si,j 6=i}Rj|. (3.2)
See Fig. 3.1 for an example.
Figure 3.1: The payoff of node i is the black area
41
We make the following observations about the payoffs Pi(s), i = 1, . . . , N . First,
the payoff of a node i depends only upon the cover set choices made by its neighbors
which are within its communication radius. This is because we assume Rc ≥ 2Rs.
Therefore, for any pair of nodes i and j, if the distance between them d(i, j) ≥ Rc,
then Ri ∩ Rj = {φ}. Second, consider a K-cover s, let s−i denote the strategies of
all the other nodes except node i, then (s′i, s−i) denotes the K-cover whereby node i
alone changes its slot selection from si to s
′
i. Then the change in the average coverage
between the two K-covers is
∆C = C(s′i, s−i)− C(si, s−i) = 1K (Pi(s′i, s−i)− Pi(si, s−i)). (3.3)
In other words, the change in coverage is proportional to the change in payoff.
Finally, assume that the nodes are rational agents who wish to maximize their
payoffs. Assume that the strategy set available to each node is the K covers, in
one of which it chooses to be active. Then, any K-cover s constitutes a strategy
profile. The N players along with their strategies (choice of one of K covers) and
associated payoffs constitutes a non-cooperative game [81]. Let us define this game
as the coverage game G. Then we have the following observations and theorem.
Observation 3.1 The coverage game G is a Graphical Game [73].
According to the payoff definition in equation (3.2), for each node i, its payoff
Pi(si, s−i) is only related to the strategies of its neighbors N(i), i.e the nodes within
its communication range Rc. Thus we have:
∀i, Pi(si, s−i) = Pi(si, sN(i)). (3.4)
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This satisfies the graphical game definition in [73]: the payoff of each player is only
related to a small subset of players in the game.
Observation 3.2 The coverage game G is a Potential Game[57] with the network
coverage C(s) as potential function Φ(s).
In the equation (3.3), replace the network coverage C(s) by the potential function
Φ(s), we obtain the equation (3.5). Hence the coverage game G satisfies potential
game definition [57]:





i, s−i)− Pi(si, s−i)). (3.5)
Theorem 3.1 For the coverage game G, the optimal strategy profile s∗ ∈ S, which
maximizes C(s) constitutes a pure Nash Equilibrium.





i ∈ Si (Si is the strategy set of player i), such that for each player
i, he cannot obtain higher payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy, i.e.,
∀i,∀si ∈ Si, Pi(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ Pi(si, s∗−i). (3.6)
Assume sˆ is the optimal strategy profile. Consider a node i and consider a strategy
profile s = (si, sˆ−i). Since sˆ is optimal, C(sˆ) − C(s) ≥ 0. Therefore, from equation
(3.3), Pi(sˆi, sˆ−i) − Pi(si, sˆ−i) ≥ 0. Since this is true for all i, according to Nash




In this section we describe both synchronous and asynchronous Nash equilibria con-
vergence algorithms.
We firstly define a concept called the regret of a node. This is inspired by the
concept of “regret” used in graphical games, and is used to design algorithms which
converge to a Nash equilibrium [79]. In our case, for any strategy profile s, each node
i has a regret Ri(s) which is defined as the most node i can gain by changing its
strategy from si to s
′
i (= 1, . . . , K). And the chosen strategy s
∗
i is defined as the best
strategy of node i in strategy profile s, denoted formally:









i, sN(i))− Pi(si, sN(i)))









i, sN(i))− Pi(si, sN(i))).
(3.7)
In equation (3.7), the latter parts come from Observation 3.1 that the payoff function
of a node i, only depends on the cover choices of its neighbors N(i). We use sN(i) to
denote the strategies of node i’s neighbors, then we can denote node i’s regret and
the best strategy as Ri(si, sN(i)) and s
∗
i (si, sN(i)) respectively.
From the definition of regret, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 For the coverage game G, a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and
only if the regret values of all the nodes are zero.
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Proof: This follows from the definition of the Nash equilibrium in equation (3.6)
and the definition of regret in equation (3.7).
Furthermore, from equation (3.3), we can see that the regret Ri(si, sN(i)) of node
i is proportional to the maximum network coverage increase (denoted as ∆Ci(s)) that
node i can provide by diverging from its current strategy profile s, given the strategies




Ri(si, sN(i)) ≥ 0. (3.8)
Note that ∆Ci(s) depends only on i’s neighbors N(i) and can be denoted as
∆Ci(si, sN(i)).
Therefore, based on the above analysis, for any given strategy profile s and any
node i with positive regret Ri(si, sN(i)) > 0, if node i changes to its best strategy
s∗i (si, sN(i)), and all its neighbors N(i) do not change their strategies in s, then node
i’s regret will decrease to zero and at the same time the network coverage increases
by 1
K
Ri(si, sN(i)) > 0.
Based on this idea, we describe the Synchronous Nash Equilibria Convergence
Algorithm (SNECA) and the asynchronous one (ANECA).
For both SNECA and ANECA, we assume that before the algorithms execute,
each nodes knows its unique ID, location, chooses a random initial strategy. More-
over, each nodes correctly found his neighbors and successfully exchange the related
information (e.g. node ID, location, initial strategy etc.) with the neighbors.
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3.4.1 Synchronous Nash Equilibria Convergence Algorithm
(SNECA)
As shown in Fig. 3.1, in SNECA each iteration consists several steps. Firstly, every
node broadcasts its regret value to its neighbors. Then, each node aggregates the re-
gret values of all its neighbors. If node i has the maximum regret among its neighbors,
it changes its strategy according to equation (3.7). Next all nodes broadcast their
updated strategies to their neighbors. The next iteration then starts. The precise
description of the algorithm is given in Fig. 3.1. In step 5, in the algorithm described
in Fig. 3.1, we also design for the case where two neighboring nodes, both have the
same maximum regret. In this case, the node with the smaller identification number
changes its strategy. We call our strategy update rule, the Greedy Updating Rule.
We observe that as a consequence of our algorithm, in any disk of radius Rc, in each
iteration, at most one node changes its strategy.
Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 SNECA converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let C∗ be the optimal average coverage possible. Since the sensor field is
of finite size, C∗ < ∞. Let st denote the strategy of all the N nodes at iteration t.
Then, since at most one node in any disk of radius Rc changes its strategy in each
iteration, and from the Greedy Updating Rule, we have:








N(i)) > 0. (3.9)
Therefore, in each iteration of SNECA the coverage is strictly increasing. Since the
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Table 3.1: Synchronous Nash Equilibria Convergence Algorithm (SNECA)
–Input : Initial strategy profile so.
Foreach iteration t: (t = 1, 2, . . .)
Begin: st−1-strategy profile in iteration t− 1;
Foreach node i
1. Calculates: regret Ri(st−1i , s
t−1







2. Sends Ri(st−1i , s
t−1
N(i)) to N(i);
3. If (Ri(st−1i , s
t−1
N(i)) = 0)⇒ sti = st−1i ; else go to 4;
4. Finds out the neighbor j with max regret values:
j = argmaxk∈N(i)Rk(st−1k , s
t−1
N(k));
5. Uses Greedy Updating Rule:






N(j))⇒ sti = s∗i (st−1i , st−1N(i));






N(j))⇒ sti = st−1i ;















i > j : sti = s
t−1
i
6. Sends sti to neighbors N(i);
End : st-strategy profile in iteration t;
–Output : Nash equilibrium s∗
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Table 3.2: Asynchronous Nash Equilibria Convergence Algorithm
(ANECA)
–Parameter : uniform random variables ω ∼ U [M(1− ),M(1 + )]; ω0 ∼ U [0,M ].
–Input : initial strategy profile s0, initial time t = 0, ∀i, initial updating time ti(0) = ω0
Foreach node i: (i = 1, 2, . . . N)
While (t = ti(k))
















3. broadcasts new sti(k)i to neighbors N(i);
4. waits for a random time ω for the next update, i.e., ti(k + 1) = ti(k) + ω;
–Output : Nash equilibrium s∗;
optimal value C∗ is finite, the sequence {C(st)} converges.
When the algorithm has converged, all regret values are zero. Therefore, from
Lemma 3.1, the strategy profile s that SNECA converges to is a Nash equilibrium for
the coverage game G.
3.4.2 Asynchronous Nash Equilibria Convergence Algorithm
(ANECA)
As shown in Fig. 3.2, in ANECA, each node i continually updates its strategy at its
updating time ti(k) (k = 0, 1, . . .). The time interval between any two consecutive
updates is a uniform random variable ω, with mean M , defined as Average Waiting
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Period (AWP) and slight perturbation defined by  (0 <  << 1). For each update,
node i changes to its best strategy based on the neighbor strategies and informs all
of its neighbors its updated strategy. The duration of AWP (i.e. M) should be
properly configured, to let each node in the average case obtain the updates from his
neighbors between his two updates. The duration of AWP will be further discussed
in Section 3.4.4, compared with the duration of iteration in SNECA. Moreover, in
ANECA the neighbor nodes will not update simultaneously. This is justified by the
random waiting time and the fact that neighbor nodes cannot broadcast their updates
simultaneously3. Therefore, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 ANECA converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let C∗ be the optimal average coverage possible. Since the sensor field is of
finite size, C∗ <∞.
Once a node changes its strategy, we regard it as a strategy change event. Let
tj denote the time, when jth strategy change event happens. Let st
j
denote the
strategies of all the N nodes after the jth strategy change event, and before the
(j + 1)th strategy change event.
Moreover, since in ANECA the neighbors will not update simultaneously, for any
node i, once it changes its strategy at some time tj, it will strictly increase the network
coverage according to equation (3.8):
C(st
j






N(i) ) > 0, j = 1, 2, . . . . (3.10)
3The random waiting time helps to randomize most of neighbors’ update events, and then even if
some neighbors’ updates do happen simultaneously or within a very small time interval, the MAC
will resolve these collisions and let the neighbors update/broadcast one by one.
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Therefore, the network coverage is strictly increasing, until all the nodes with zero




When the algorithm has converged, all regret values are zero. Therefore, from
Lemma 3.1, the strategy profile s that ANECA converges to is a Nash equilibrium
for coverage game G.
3.4.3 Discussion: SNECA and ANECA
3.4.3.1 Coverage
Booth SNECA and ANECA converge to Nash equilibrium solutions, therefore, their
coverage performance will be very close to each other.
3.4.3.2 Convergence Time
First, under the same network condition, one iteration in SNECA is closed to one
AWP in ANECA.
In SNECA, in each iteration each node firstly broadcasts its regret to the neigh-
bors and then only the nodes, which change strategies, broadcast their new strategies
to neighbors. The duration of the iteration is mainly determined by the time re-
quired for each node to get the regret packets from his neighbors. After the nodes
successfully exchange their regrets with the neighbors, within each neighborhood, at
most one node will change and broadcast the strategy, therefore, the changing nodes
can almost broadcast the new strategies immediately at the end of the iteration with
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some slight perturbation.
In ANECA, initially the nodes randomly start and then each node broadcasts its
updated strategy to neighbors after a random waiting time with mean M and some
slight perturbation. The Average Waiting Period (AWP), i.e. M time, is properly
configured, to let each node in the average case obtain the updated strategies from
its neighbors between two updates of its own. In this case, each node has an equal
opportunity to change strategy and can better make its own decision based on its
neighbors’ updates.
Therefore, the duration of iteration in SNECA and the duration of AWP in
ANECA are both determined by the time required for each node to get the broad-
caste packets (i.e. regret packet in SNECA and strategy packet in ANECA) from
its neighbors. This duration is mainly related to the network density (or say the
maximum number of nodes within one neighborhood), the underlying MAC protocol,
and the environmental condition etc. It means in the same network, with the same
MAC protocol and under the same environment, the duration of iteration and the
AWP should be the same.
Second, in ANECA nodes updates more frequently than nodes in SNECA.
In SNECA, in each iteration, within every neighborhood, only one node with
maximum regret value will update to the best strategy and broadcast to the neighbors.
In ANECA, within one AWP, within every neighborhood, in the average case
every node will update once, i.e. calculate its payoff according to the neighbors’
strategies, choose the best strategy and broadcast to the neighbors. In this case, let’s
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say the average number of nodes within one neighborhood is Nb, then within each
iteration (or AWP) the average number of updates in ANECA is Nb times of the
average number of updates in SNECA.
Therefore, under perfect condition (i.e. perfect MAC, noise free environment, no
packet loss, etc.) ANECA probably converge faster than SNECA, with much more
frequent updates, however under a noisy environment (i.e. with high packet loss rate)
SNECA may perform better with less but high quality updates and converge faster.
The detailed results and discussions will be introduced later in Section 3.6.
3.4.4 Practical Considerations
1. Network Overhead: Both SNECA and ANECA have small network overhead.
In SNECA, in each iteration each node firstly broadcasts its regret to the
neighbors and then only the nodes, which change strategies, broadcast their
new strategies to neighbors. So the total number of packets broadcast in each
iteration is smaller than 2N and the size of each broadcast packet is a few bytes,
including the sender ID and the regret value or new strategy. In ANECA, each
node broadcast its updated strategy to neighbors after a random waiting time
with mean M and some slight perturbation. Within each AWP, i.e. M , the
average number of packets broadcast is around N and each broadcast packet
is a few bytes, including the sender ID and the new strategy only.
2. Predefined execution time: According to the existing resources (e.g., number
of nodes, sensing area of each node, etc.), the number of running iterations
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Ts in SNECA and the running time Ta in ANECA can be estimated through
a number of simulations before deploying the nodes in the targeted field. In
practice, to guarantee convergence we can properly choose sufficiently large Ts
or Ta. Then, after deployment even if nodes cannot converge in the predefined
Ts iterations or Ta time, we can have a recovery phase to help nodes converge
to pure Nash equilibria at a later time.
3. Real environment: In real wireless networks, transmission delay and packet
loss problems exist. For the transmission delay, in our algorithm nodes only
broadcast some small packets to their neighbors, so this delay is very short.
Compared with the duration of each iteration in SNECA and the random
waiting time in ANECA, the transmission delay can be reasonably ignored.
The packet losses, caused by the MAC collision, the environment noise and so
forth, will be investigated through extensive simulations in section 3.6.
3.5 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the optimality and the complexity of Nash equilibria
in the coverage game. First we evaluate the ratio between the optimal coverage
and the worst-case Nash equilibrium coverage, so-called “Price of Anarchy” [54] in
game theory literature. Moreover, we theoretically evaluate the complexity of finding












Cover 1 Cover 2 Cover 1 Cover 2
Solution II: Nash Equilibrium,
but only sub-optimal
Solution I : optimal, and
also Nash Equilibrium
Figure 3.2: Optimal solution and Nash equilibrium, a simple example:
four nodes A,B,C,D and two covers in the network
Figure 3.3: A simple example with m = 3. In this network, we have
six nodes and two covers. The figure demonstrates a Nash equilibrium
solution, here we have the maximum of three nodes covering the same
point, in the black areas in Cover 1 or 2.
In Theorem 3.1, we proved that in coverage game the optimal solution constitutes
an Nash equilibrium. However, in a coverage game, normally several Nash equilibria
exist, and some Nash equilibrium is only a sub-optimal solution. We give a simple
example. In Fig. 3.2 any node in the Solution II does not have any incentive to
change the strategy, considering their own payoffs, although if both A and B (or C
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and D) change strategies together, all the nodes’ payoffs and the network coverage
can all be improved. This kind of loss caused by the players’ selfish considerations
is called “Price of Anarchy [54]”. We study the price of anarchy of coverage game.
For a coverage game G, let sˆ be the optimal solution, which maximizes the network
coverage. Moreover, using SNECA or ANECA, we obtain a pure Nash equilibria s∗
and the corresponding coverages C(s∗). The Price of Anarchy for the coverage game









We know that the coverage game is a potential game from Observation 3.1. In
the potential game the existence of pure Nash equilibrium is guaranteed [57], and
many researchers are interested in studying the price of anarchy for different poten-
tial games. Among all related literature [54, 59, 18, 85], the facility location game
studied in [59] is similar to our coverage game, since both have the potential function
coinciding with social utility 4. In [59], the authors can bound their price of anarchy
by two. For our coverage game G we can bound the price of anarchy by a factor
smaller than two, shown in the following theorem.








where m is the maximum number of nodes, which cover any point, in the Nash equi-
librium solution s∗. A simple example with m = 3 is shown in Fig. 3.3.
4in the coverage game, the network coverage is the social utility and also the potential function.
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Proof: In the coverage game G, s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN) is a strategy profile, or say
a partition solution. For the convenience of our following analysis, we introduce a
complex strategy profile (s⊕ s′), in which each node i choose two strategies (both si
and s′i). So in (s
∗⊕ sˆ) each node chooses both the optimal and the Nash equilibrium
strategies. Obviously, for network coverage we have C(sˆ) ≤ C(s∗ ⊕ sˆ). Let C(s) =
K · C(s).
Then, consider the following instance. At first all the nodes only choose their
Nash equilibrium strategies, and then from node 1 to N , each node adds its optimal
strategy one by one. Each time a node i adds its optimal strategy sˆi, the network
coverage increase, denoted as ∆ Ci( s∗ ⊕ sˆ), is shown as follows:
∆ Ci( s∗ ⊕ sˆ)
= C
[




s∗ ⊕ (sˆ, . . . , sˆi−, s∗i , . . . , s∗N)
]
≤ Pi(sˆi, s∗−i). (3.12)
Furthermore, based on equation (3.12) and consider the Nash equilibrium defini-
tion in equation (3.6), we have, ∆ Ci( s∗ ⊕ sˆ) ≤ Pi(sˆi, s∗−i) ≤ Pi(s∗i , s∗−i) = Pi(s∗). It
means that each time after a node i adds its optimal strategy, the coverage increase
{∆ Ci( s∗ ⊕ sˆ)} cannot be larger than the node’s payoff in the Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile {Pi(s∗)}. Thus, summing up all the changes ∆ Ci( s∗ ⊕ sˆ), i = , , . . . , N ,
we have:
C(s∗ ⊕ sˆ)− C(s∗) =∑Ni=∆ Ci( s∗ ⊕ sˆ) ≤∑Ni= Pi(s∗), (3.13)
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On the other hand, the optimal total coverage is upper bounded by a constant A, the






C(s∗) ≤ 1 +
A−∑Ni=1 Pi(s∗)
C(s∗) . (3.15)
In equation (3.15), we use an obvious result that C(s∗) ≥∑Ni= Pi(s∗), according the
payoff definition in equation (3.2).



































In both cases, we define m as the maximum number of nodes, which cover any
point, in the Nash equilibrium solution s∗. A simple example with m = 3 is shown
in Fig. 3.3





























































































































(A−∑Ni=1 Pi(s∗) 6= 0).
=

1 (A−∑Ni=1 Pi(s∗) = 0);
2− 1
m+1
(A−∑Ni=1 Pi(s∗) 6= 0).












In addition, to better evaluate the value of m in Theorem 3.4, we did extensive
simulations and obtained m values and the corresponding network coverage when
varying N , K and R, shown in Fig. 3.4. Here all the results are the average of 100
runs with different Nash equilibria solutions. We can see that m is increasing from 2
to 7 accordingly with the network coverage increasing from 50% to 90%. So the price




. It means that
in the worst case, we can still guarantee that the network coverage provided by the
Nash equilibria solutions is more than 60% (with m = 5
3
) or 53% (with m = 15
8
) of
the optimal network coverage. However, in the practice the worse case rarely happens
and the Nash equilibria can almost provide close to optimal coverage performance,
which we will demonstrate later in section 3.6.
59






























(a) m vs. N






























(b) m vs. K






























(c) m vs. R
Figure 3.4: relationship between m and N,K,R
3.5.2 Complexity
Now we analyze the complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in the coverage game.
First, we know that Set K-cover problem is NP-complete [78], so it is impossible
to find the optimal solutions in polynomial time, unless NP = P . We design SNECA
or ANECA to find sub-optimal solutions (Nash equilibria). Nash equilibria can also
be regarded as the locally optimal solutions and correspondingly SNECA or ANECA
are local search algorithms. As said in [71] “Local optimality arises in the context
of the local search algorithms, which try to find improved solutions by considering
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perturbations of the current solution (“neighbors” of that solution)”. Obviously, it
is easier to find locally optimal solutions than finding the optimal solutions, so the
question, whether we find locally optimal solutions in polynomial time?
Papadimitriou in [71] well analyzed this class of problems. They investigated the
complexity of finding locally optimal solutions to NP-hard combinatorial optimization
problems and found that many popular local search algorithms are not known to be
computable in polynomial time, either by using the local search algorithms themselves
or by taking some indirect route. So they defined a natural class, Polynomial Local
Search (PLS) consisting essentially of those local search problems for which local
optimality can be verified in polynomial time. They also show that there are complete
problems for this class, e.g., finding the locally optimal solutions for graph partition
problem with respect to the Kernighan-Lin algorithm is PLS-complete, and hence can
be accomplished in polynomial time only if local optima can be found in polynomial
time for all local search problems in PLS.
Later in [86], Krentel proved that finding locally optimal solutions in weighted
Not-All-Equal 3 SAT (NAE3SAT) problem with respect to the FLIP algorithm is
also PLS-complete, denoted this problem as POSNAE3FLIP problem. We will use
this result later in our proof.
A more interesting result for us is that recently in [74] Fabrikant et al. proved that
finding the pure Nash equilibria in general congestion games (a kind of potential game)
is also PLS-complete and they essentially extended the space of “potential games” as
encompassing all of the class PLS, i.e., any problem in PLS can be cast as a game
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whose pure equilibria are guaranteed to exist by a potential function. Moreover, they
provided the worst-case examples of game, which need at least exponential time to
converge to Nash equilibrium. It means that in PLS-complete problems, in the worst-
case we may need exponential time to find the locally optimal solutions, if P is not
equal to NP.
Therefore, we prove the PLS-completeness of our local search problem in the
following theorem to demonstrate its complexity, however, we should metion that
in the practice the worst cases rarely happen and usually we can find pure Nash
equilibria quickly using SNECA or ANECA.
Theorem 3.5 It is PLS-complete to find a pure Nash equilibrium in the general
coverage game. 5
Proof: First, based on PLS definition in [71] we demonstrate that finding Nash
equilibria in the general coverage game is in PLS.
For any coverage game G, withK covers and N nodes, there is a set of instances
I, defined by different network topology; For each x ∈ I, there are a set of feasible
solutions F(x) by letting each node choose a cover from K; For each solution S ∈
F(x), there is a measure function µ(S, x), defined as network coverage and a
set of neighboring solutions N (S, x), defined as solutions obtained from S by
letting only one node change its strategy. Since all the I,F(x), µ(S, x),N (S, x) are
polynomial-time computable, finding Nash equilibria in the general coverage game is
in PLS.
5In the general coverage game, the coverage area of each sensor node can be arbitrary and are not
restricted as a circle.
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Furthermore, we reduce from the POSNAE3FLIP problem [87] to prove PLS-
completeness of our problem.
POSNAE3FLIP problem denotes NAE-3SAT problem with respect to FLIP local
search algorithm. NAE-3SAT problem consists ofN binary variables {x1, x2, . . . , xN},
xi ∈ {0, 1} and a number of clauses. Each clause Ci includes at most three variables
and a weight Wi, denoted as, Ci = Wi{xj, xk, xh}. The objective value O is the sum
of weights of all the satisfiable clause, i.e., not all equal clauses. The FLIP local
search algorithm is to find a variable assignment, satisfying that the objective value
O cannot be improved by flipping a variable.
We propose “the reduced general coverage game”, which has two covers K = 2
and in the network each area can be covered by at most three nodes. We demonstrate
that finding pure Nash equilibria in the reduced general coverage game is equivalent
to POSNAE3FLIP problem.
Given an instance of POSNAE3FLIP problem, we can construct the problem of
finding pure Nash equilibria in the reduced general coverage game as follows:
1. Clause Ci ⇔ Area Ai in target area
(a) Weight Wi ⇔ the size of area Ai;
(b) Variables {xj, xk, xh} ⇔ sensor nodes {sj, sk, sh} covering the area Ai;
(c) Variable xi =0 or 1 ⇔ node i chooses cover 0 or 1;
2. Satisfied clause Ci ⇔ Area Ai is covered twice in both cover 0 and 1;
Un-satisfied clause Cj ⇔ Area Aj is covered once in cover 0 or 1.
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3. Objective value O ⇔ the total coverage C (sum of the K covers’ coverage)
minus a constant B. B is the network coverage if all the nodes are in cover 0.
4. A flip (change a variable from 0 to 1, or 1 to 0) ⇔ An update (a node changes
strategy from cover 0 to 1, or 1 to 0).
In POSNAE3FLIP problem, a flip improves the objective value (O) if it makes
some unsatisfied clauses (all 0 or all 1) to be satisfied (some 1, some 0). Similarly in
the general coverage game, a node improves network coverage (C) if it changes some
singly-covered area (all 0 or 1) to doubly-covered area (some 0 and some 1). So for
each local optimal solution and the local search move in POSNAE3FLIP, we can find
the corresponding pure Nash equilibrium solution and the local update in the reduced
general coverage game. Therefore, we say that POSNAE3FLIP is equivalent to the
problem of finding pure Nash equilibria in the reduced general coverage game.
Since POSNAE3FLIP is known to be PLS-complete [87], finding pure Nash equi-
libria in the reduced general coverage game is PLS-complete. Moreover, since the
reduced general coverage game is a subset of the general coverage game, finding pure
Nash equilibria in the general coverage game is PLS-complete.
3.6 Simulation and Discussion
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm via extensive simula-
tions. When comparisons are made, we compare against the following:
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1. k-cover: This is the distributed greedy algorithm described in [78]. Each node
makes its decision sequentially, according to their ID numbers. A node chooses
the cover in which it can maximally increase the total coverage, based on the
decisions of previous nodes.




3. optimal: To compute the optimal K-cover, we assume a sensing field which
is divided into an T × T grids. N nodes are placed randomly in the field.
Coverage is tested on these T 2 grid points. We define the following:
Cj: the coverage of cover j, j = 1, . . . , K
Xij =










1, if node i covers grid point t
0, otherwise.
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(t = 1, 2, . . . , T 2, j = 1, 2, . . . , K);
K∑
j=1
Xij = 1, (i = 1, 2, . . . , N). (3.19)
Note that we are discretizing the problem by dividing the sensor field into grid
points. The optimal solution is an upper bound to the actual optimal solution.
3.6.1 Simulation Design
We randomly place N nodes in a square region with 50× 50 grid points. The sensing
range of each node is R grids and thus each node can cover a disk area centered at
itself with radius of R. All the nodes are divided into K covers and the coverage
is measured by the number of covered grid points divided by the total number of
grid points (50 × 50). For the ANECA algorithm, the waiting time of each node
is a uniform random variable with mean M and slight perturbation ε = 0.2. As
discussed in Section 3.4.4, the duration of one iteration in SNECA and the duration
of the Average Waiting Period (AWP) in ANECA (i.e. M) are the same under the
same network condition. Therefore, in the following simulations, the convergence
time is measured by iterations in SNECA and by AWPs in ANECA. These results
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are focusing on the convergence process, and are independent of underlying MAC
protocols, network density, environment condition etc., which will affect the duration
of the iteration or AWP.
Moreover, in wireless networks because of MAC collision, environment noise, etc.,
sometimes nodes may not receive packets from their neighbors. Therefore, to eval-
uate the robustness of both SNECA and ANECA algorithms, we assume that with
probability p nodes can’t receive the decision packets from their neighbors. In our
simulations, we vary p from 0 to 0.5. While a network with 50% packet loss proba-
bility may seem unrealistic, it is interesting to study the behavior of algorithms in a
more hostile environment.
In addition, under the noisy environment (with p > 0), we can only say that
the algorithms converge under the following two conditions: (1) All the nodes have
zero regret values; (2) All the nodes have the correct strategies information of their
neighbors. The second condition is to guarantee that nodes will not deviate from the
obtained Nash equilibria, due to the information asymmetry with their neighbors.
All the results reported below are obtained based on this convergence rule and
are averages of 50 simulations runs.
3.6.2 Convergence Process
In Fig. 3.5, we demonstrate the convergence of both SNECA and ANECA under
different packet loss probability p. When p = 0, i.e., no packets loss, for both cases, the
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(b) ANECA (the duration of 1 AWP = 1 iteration in SNECA)
Figure 3.5: Convergence Process
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The ANECA converges even faster than SNECA 6, because in ANECA each node
in the average changes strategy once in one AWP, while in SNECA nodes normally
wait for several iterations to change strategies. When p > 0, for both cases, the
convergence time is increasing accordingly with p. However, for SNECA, the network
coverage still increases smoothly, because in each iteration only nodes with maximum
regrets in their neighborhoods can change strategies. In this case, even some of
the regret packets are missing, the changing nodes may still have positive regrets
and thus improve the total network coverage by a positive number, but just smaller
compared with the maximum regret node. For ANECA, the network coverage does
not increase gracefully, but decreases frequently. In ANECA nodes change strategies
more frequently, thus once the p increases, more and more nodes have out-of-date
information of their neighbors and may frequently make wrong decisions, resulting in
coverage decreasing frequently.
3.6.3 Coverage Performance
In Fig. 3.6 we compare the coverage performance of SNECA, ANECA with k-cover,
random and optimal. We see that SNECA and ANECA achieve almost the same
coverage, since both of them converge to Nash equilibria in the coverage game. And
they (SNECA and ANECA) marginally outperforms the k-cover algorithm, and are
much better than random algorithm. Moreover, we can see that the SNECA and
ANECA can achieve nearly the optimal coverage, although in the theory we can only
prove a 50% plus lower bound. Finally, with the increase of network density, both























Figure 3.6: Coverage Performance of SNECA,ANECA, optimal, random
and k-cover under different network densities
differences (optimal from SNECA or ANECA, and SNECA or ANECA from k-cover)
are decreasing.
3.6.4 Convergence Time
We investigate the convergence time of SNECA and ANECA, as N , K, R varies,
under different packet loss probability p, shown in Fig. 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 respectively.
As mentioned before, to focus on the convergence process and irrespective of the
practical network condition, the convergence time is measured by iterations in SNECA



























































(b) ANECA (the duration of 1 AWP = 1 iteration in SNECA)





















































(b) ANECA (the duration of 1 AWP = 1 iteration in SNECA)


























































(b) ANECA (the duration of 1 AWP = 1 iteration in SNECA)
Figure 3.9: Convergence Speed vs. Sensing Range (R)
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For ANECA, in all the three cases, when p is small (≤ 0.2), the convergence
time increases slightly as N , K or R increases. However, when p is large (≥ 0.3),
the convergence time increases dramatically with the increase of N , K or R. This
is caused by the fact that in ANECA, nodes frequently change their strategies, e.g.,
for each node, it changes strategy every AWP in average. Thus, with the increase of
N or R, the number of strategy changes increases dramatically. With the increase of
K, nodes have higher probability to make wrong decisions based on the out-of-date
information of neighbors. Therefore, in the large p environment, with either large
N , K or R, the nodes will frequently make wrong decisions, as a result they need a
longer time to converge. Otherwise, in the small p environment or with small N , K
and R, ANECA can still converge fast.
For SNECA, in all the three cases, the convergence time increases accordingly
with the increase of p. For the same p, the convergence time increases only slightly
as N , K or R increases. This is benefited from its strict Greedy Updating Rule. In
each iteration at most one node in any disk of radius Rc (2Rs) changes its strategy, so
with the increase of N or R, the number of strategy changes only increases slightly.
Moreover, a node can change its strategy only under the condition that it has the
maximum regret value within its neighborhood, so it is highly possible that nodes still
make correct decisions, even with the wrong information of their neighbors. Thus,
the bad effect caused by the increase of K can be greatly decreased. Therefore, in
SNECA the convergence time increases slightly with the increase of p, N , K, or R
respectively.
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All in all, when p is small, ANECA converges faster than SNECA, because nodes
frequently change strategies, correctly improve network coverage, and converge to
Nash equilibrium. When p is large, SNECA converges faster than ANECA, because
the strict Max Regret Update rule help eliminate a lot of wrong decisions, let the
network coverage still increase gracefully and converge to Nash equilibrium.
In addition, we can see that in the convergence time both SNECA and ANECA,
perform much better than the k-cover algorithm, which is not a scalable algorithm,
i.e. needs N iterations for the nodes to choose the covers, and cannot perform well
under high packet loss environment.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigated the coverage problem in wireless sensor networks
using a game theory method. We assume that nodes are randomly scattered in a
sensor field and the goal is to partition these nodes into K sets. At any given time,
nodes belonging to only one of these sets actively sense the field. A key challenge is
to achieve this partition in a distributed manner with purely local information and
yet provide near optimal coverage. We appropriately formulate this coverage problem
as a coverage game and prove that the optimal solution is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Then, we design synchronous and asynchronous algorithms, which converge to pure
Nash equilibria. Moreover, we analyze the optimality and complexity of pure Nash
equilibria in the coverage game. We prove that, the ratio between the optimal coverage




maximum number of nodes, which cover any point, in the Nash equilibrium solution
s∗). We prove that finding pure Nash equilibria in the general coverage game is
PLS-complete, i.e., “as hard as that of finding a local optimum in any local search
problem with efficient computable neighbors”. Finally, via extensive simulations, we
show that, the Nash equilibria coverage performance is very close to the optimal
coverage and the convergence speed is sublinear. Even under the noisy environment,
our algorithms can still converge to the pure Nash equilibria.
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Chapter 4
WiFi Sharing Game in Wireless
Community Networks
In Chapter 3, we studied the coverage game in wireless sensor networks. In this
chapter, we will apply game theoretical methods in the WiFi sharing community
networks and incentivize users’ cooperation in the community.
4.1 Introduction
Ubiquitous anytime anywhere Internet access is no longer a luxury and has become a
fundamental need. This has prompted significant investment in next generation wire-
less wide area networking solutions such as WiMAX and LTE. However, there is also
an emerging interest in lower cost alternatives. This has led to tremendous academic
and industry interest in community networks. This is an idea which exploits the
fact that several urban cities already have dense deployments of Wi-Fi access points
in residential areas, enterprizes and public spaces. Clearly this existing deployment
could be exploited to provide ubiquitous access to all users.
This is especially exciting given that hand-held vendors such as Nokia, Apple
etc, have started to sell phones/PDAs with multiple radio interfaces, including WiFi.
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These device have powerful user interfaces which allows users to browse the web,
access email and make VoIP calls. While the penetration of such devices is still small
at present, we envision that in a few years, most phones and hand-held devices will
have such capabilities.
Companies such as FON [48] and Whisher [49] have solutions which aim to enable
safe and secure sharing of WiFi bandwidth. They also address the legal issues by
partnering with ISPs to ensure that ISPs are adequately compensated for users from
different ISPs using each others networks. In [88], the authors propose a wireless
community network solution, with incentives users to share bandwidth.
However these solutions have certain drawbacks. The FON solution requires users
to buy a new WiFi router from FON, the La Fonera, while the WCN solution [88]
requires users to change the firmware on their existing routers. We believe that
expecting users to buy new routers or to have the technical sophistication to flash
new firmware on their routers are severe handicaps to the widespread uptake of WiFi
community networks. Whisher, [49] has a solution which only requires each user to
download a piece of software on to his personal computer. However, the Whisher
solution does not ensure that all users are good citizens. For example, there is no
accounting mechanism to see if the user is sharing his network and if so, to what
extent. Once a user signs on to the Whisher community he can get unlimited access to
other community user’s networks irrespective of whether his access point is ”actually”
shared. Moreover, in the Whisher solution the WEP keys of all the users’ access points
is stored in encrypted form on all the Whisher user’s personal computers. This could
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be a barrier for the uptake of this solution.
In this work, our goal is to design a solution which does not require users to either
buy new hardware or be sophisticated enough to upgrade their firmware. Clearly this
points towards a solution similar to Whisher. Our goal is to design a solution which
only requires a software download to end users’ personal computers. We do not make
the assumption that this software cannot be tampered with by end users. Our goal
is to design a system which ensures secure and accountable access, i.e., users cannot
receive more service than they deserve/provide. Moreover, we require that a user
cannot repeatedly obtain unauthorized network access.
We make the following contributions in this work:
1. We propose a system and architecture which requires only a client side software
application. We propose a credit based mechanism which accounts for how well
a user shares his resources and obtains service in return. This mechanism is
robust to tampering of the client side software and self-interested behavior of
users. See Section 4.3.
2. We investigate the performance of the system in terms of stability, convergence
etc., by making simple but plausible assumptions about user behavior. We
show that the system converges to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium via
analysis and extensive simulations. See Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6
3. We investigate the behavior of the system with real world traces and validate
that our system will behave in a stable and robust manner. See Section 4.7
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4.2 Related Work
WiFi sharing solutions: Sharing WiFi bandwidth has attracted a lot of interest
from academia and industry. FON [48] has built a WiFi sharing community by selling
their customized router (“La Fonera”), which authenticates the accessing users and
connects to a FON server through the Internet. FON also protects user’s connections
using two signals: 1) an encrypted WiFi signal only for the owner’s private use; 2)
a public signal for the other FON users. However the FON solution requires users
to upgrade to a new WiFi router provided by FON and this could be an obstacle for
further growth.
Whisher [49] provides a simpler solution. The user only needs to install a client
software on his computer, which includes the encrypted WEP keys of all the other
users in the community. This allows them to access other users’ encrypted WiFi net-
works using Whisher clients. This simple solution makes it easy for users joining the
community, however, putting all the users’ network passwords in each user’s personal
computer, must be handled very carefully considering the high security risks. More-
over, the Whisher solution does not have a credit based mechanism which incentivizes
users to genuinely share bandwidth. For example, a user can register for Whisher but
switch off his access point whenever he is not using his access point.
In [89], the authors provide a secure WiFi sharing solution using tunneling tech-
nology. Each time when a guest requests the service from a host access point. They
handoff the host’s responsibility to a trusted point (normally the guest’s home access
point) by tunneling the guest’s packets through it. This helps to prevent guest’s ma-
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licious behaviors and also guarantees that the guest’s traffic cannot be subverted by
malicious hosts. Once again they do not address the issue of credit based incentive
mechanisms for sharing bandwidth.
PERM [90] and Mushroom Networks [91] provide solutions for users to improve
their connection speeds by aggregating bandwidth from neighboring access points.
These solutions address a different problem from ours.
In [92], the authors studied how the evolution of social community networks (e.g.,
FON, Whisher) is conditioned by the initial provided coverage, the subscription fee
and user sensitivity to the provided coverage and its competition with the centralized
networks operating in licensed bands (e.g., cellular networks, WiMAX networks.)
However, the above solutions either assume the users in their community would
like to share their WiFi voluntarily [48, 49, 89, 92] or restrict the sharing within a small
range, e.g., neighboring users or friends [90, 91]. To build up a citywide/worldwide
ubiquitous WiFi access network, only sharing with neighbors or friends is not enough.
Moreover to persuade users to share their WiFi networks with strangers, an incentive
mechanism is required. This is what we aim to address in this work.
Reference [88] addresses this problem. The authors provide a receipt-based reci-
procity mechanism for wireless social community networks without a centralized au-
thority. Users sign digital receipts when they consume service. The receipts form a
receipt graph, which helps the user identify the contributing users and only contribute
to his contributors or contributors’ contributors. Similar to any reputation-based
mechanism, it only works well among frequently interacting users.
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In addition, most existing solutions require users to either buy a new router
[48, 91] or flash new firmware [88] in the existing router. In this work we provide a
simple solution like Whisher, which only requires a client side software on the user’s
personal computer.
Cooperation in ad hoc networks: Cooperation has also been studied in wireless
ad hoc networks [34, 93, 40], [24, 27, 94, 32]. These can be roughly classified into
credit-based systems and reputation-based. However, as well explained in [88], while
these works propose similar ideas to ours, the exact issues addressed are different.
For example, different from ad hoc network, in WCN, there is only one intermediate
relaying node (the WLAN AP), which is also connected to a fixed power supply and
to the internet.
Incentive mechanism in Peer to Peer sharing system: In P2P systems, differ-
ent from WiFi community networks, selfish peers can be forced to share (i.e., upload
resource) when they are benefiting from others (i.e., download resources) and peers
cannot misreport the amount of bandwidth they consumed. Therefore, most incentive
mechanisms ([95, 96, 97] and [98]) are designed based on the above features.
4.3 System Design
Design Goals: Based on our earlier discussion, our design goals are the following:
• Client side solution: Unlike FON, the user should not be expected to buy
any new access point hardware or make firmware modifications to his existing
access points. Our goal is design a solution which only requires a client side
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software download.
• Robust: Our goal is to design a robust system which users cannot exploit to
their advantage. By this we mean that we make no assumptions that the client
side software cannot be tampered with. The system should work in a robust
manner in spite of possible malicious behavior.
• Credit based: Our goal is to design a credit based mechanism to ensure ac-
countability. In other words we would like to ensure that users receive credit
for the bandwidth they share. These credits can then be used to obtain service
from other access points.
• Stable and Efficient: Our credit mechanism, coupled with a punishment mech-
anism when users are caught exploiting the system, should result in a stable
behavior, i.e., users should converge to a Nash Equilibrium solution and should
not have incentive to cheat in the long run. Moreover the solution should be
efficient, i.e., each user should obtain as much service as he deserves and no
less.
Overview: The Wi-Sh system consists of the following components: (i) client side
software which runs on users’ personal computers and a (ii) central server as shown
in Fig. 4.1. We describe in greater detail, the roles and responsibilities of each of
these components.
4.3.1 Client Software











Figure 4.1: The architecture of Wi-Sh System
Access
The Wi-Sh client is responsible for logging in to another user’s access point. We
assume that the WEP key/password of an access point is some function of the access
point’s MAC address, which is advertised in its beacon signal (e.g., the MAC address
encrypted with the Wi-Sh public key)1. Clearly this does not appear to be a very
secure solution, given that a user who is not a member of the Wi-Sh community
could exploit this to obtain free access. We will discuss later how the monitoring
mechanism coupled with the blacklisting mechanism in the client and server can help
mitigate this. Building a completely secure solution with a pure client based solution
1Through this design, once a community user approaches an access point, he can get the WEP key
based on the advertised MAC address and the function stored in the Wi-Sh client. In this case,
it is not necessary to store all the user’s password in Wi-Sh client, as what Whisher [49] did. At
the same time, for security consideration Wi-Sh server can change the function occasionally and
Wi-Sh client can get updated function once connected to the server.
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is extremely challenging. However, we wish to avoid solutions like Whisher, where
the passwords of all access points of the community are stored in encrypted form in
the client’s personal computer.
Reporting
The client side software is responsible for reporting to the central server whenever
the user uses another user’s access point to access the Internet. The Wi-Sh client is
responsible for reporting the identity of the user, the identity of the AP, and his usage
to the Wi-Sh server. For example, once user A is using the AP of user B, the Wi-Sh
client of user A, will send a packet (including user ID, AP ID and a timestamp) to the
Wi-Sh server every 10 minutes, and thus the server can obtain the online duration of
user A under the AP of user B. Moreover, with all the reporting packets received in
the past 10 minutes, the Wi-Sh server can come out a list of reporting users under
different APs in the past 10 minutes.
However, please note that since the Wi-Sh client is entirely under the control of
the client, we make no assumptions about how robust it is. It is possible for example,
for the user to have a hacked version where the reporting mechanism is switched off.
We call these non-reporting users cheaters. The existence of cheaters is the main
reason why the monitoring function is required in the Wi-Sh client.
Monitoring and Punishment
Whenever a user is online, his Wi-Sh client is responsible for monitoring his access
point for undesirable usage, e.g. the non-reporting cheaters in his AP. Specifically,
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when the AP owner is online, he/she can get the information of who are currently
using his/her AP through checking router logs. For example, the owner can check the
router logs every 10 minutes and send the list of users, which appeared in the logs in
the past 10 minutes, to the Wi-Sh server. Then, the server will compare this list with
the list of users reported under this AP in the past 10 minutes to catch the cheaters.
The cheaters will be punished in a period for high price, i.e. pay more credits per
unit.
In our system, the AP owner can do real-time monitoring and send the monitoring
information to the central server through checking the current router logs. However,
the use of historical router logs for monitoring is not allowed, since this will require
tight synchronization between the server and all APs. Moreover the amount of state
information that the server will have to maintain becomes very large. In light of
these considerations, we only require the client to communicate information about
the current set of clients looged into the AP.
Moreover, we are explicitly assuming that users do not necessarily monitor their
own networks 24/7. This is a reasonable assumption given that many users only
have a laptop which they carry with them all the time. If some users would like
to have a computer placed at home and monitor their routers 24/7, our monitoring
function will help them catch all the cheaters, but I guess, for most users, they prefer
to only monitor their routers occasionally when they are online. In this case, with
some probability the cheaters will not be caught.Therefore, a pricing and punishment
mechanism is designed to discourage the cheating behaviors, details in Section 4.4.2.
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Please also note that since the users have full control of their AP routers and
Wi-Sh clients. It is also possible that the users can send false monitoring information
to the server through hacking Wi-Sh clients or forging router logs. For this kind of
cheating behaviors, we will discuss and analyze later in Chapter 5. In this chapter,
we only consider the non-reporting cheating behaviors. We also generally introduce
the punishment, enforced on each type of cheaters to prevent cheating. Later in
Section 5.3.2, we will explain in details and theoretically analyze these punishment
mechanisms.
In addition, as an alternative we could have had the server monitoring all the
access points in the community. However, this would have required periodic polling
of all the access points in the community to access their usage. This may not be a
scalable solution and would add significant network overhead and load at the server.
MAC Address Filtering
Periodically the Wi-Sh client receives updates from the server with a list of blacklisted
MAC addresses. The Wi-Sh client then automatically modifies the list of blacklisted
MAC addresses on its access point.
4.3.2 Server
The server is responsible for management and accounting of user accounts described
below:
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• User Accounts: Each user u is associated with an access point Au. Multiple
users could be associated with the same access point. This reflects situations
where multiple users in a home could own the same access point. All credits
earned via sharing an access point is shared equitably among all the users
associated with that access point. There could be a maximum limit on the
number of users associated with an access point (e.g., five), similar to [88].
Each user’s account consists of his identity, password (for authentication), his
MAC IDs (possibly more than one), and his associated access point identity.
• Accounting: The server maintains records of the number of credits earned per
access point, records of each user’s behavior (cheating or not) and the price
that each user should be charged when he is associated with another member’s
access point.
Whenever a user u uses a user v’s access point, user v earns credits for sharing
his access point. User u pays for the right to access user v’s access point from
the credits which he has earned when other users using his access point. If
user u has been an honest user (i.e., his Wi-Sh client always reports his usage),
then user is charged at a rate of one credit per unit time, i.e., the price he
is charged is equal to the duration of the session. On the other hand, if u
has been a misbehaving member of the community, he is charged at a higher
rate which depends on his past behavior. This is essentially a punishment
mechanism which aims to keep the user honest. Recall that a Wi-Sh member
u is known to be misbehaving( i.e., accessing another user v’s access point Av
88
without reporting), only when user v is monitoring his network at that time.
• Blacklists: Whenever a user monitors his access point and reports MAC address
usage of users who do not belong to the community, the server updates it
blacklist and periodically forwards this to all the clients in Wi-Sh community.
A Wi-Sh community member could also be blacklisted if he is found to be
repeatedly misbehaving (i.e., not reporting his usage). However, note that this
mechanism could still be subverted via MAC address spoofing.
In addition, even if the central server fails or is hacked, the users can immediately
change their APs’ passwords and configurations to prevent the attacks from strangers.
4.4 System Modeling
In this section, we provide an analytical framework for community WiFi sharing. The
goal is to provide insights on the hooks and handles one needs to be aware of when
designing mechanisms for sharing WiFi bandwidth among a community of users.
To this end, we make some assumptions, which while not entirely accurate, help to
illustrate the underlying system dynamics and important algorithm design knobs.
4.4.1 Assumptions and Preliminaries
We assume that there are N users in the community. We assume that each user i per-
forms two independent functions. First, a user i spends some of his time monitoring
the activity on his network. By this we mean that he monitors if other users are using
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his network and ensures that there are no users cheating to obtain service without
reporting it to the Wi-Sh server. We assume that the time spent in the monitoring
state is defined by an exponential random variable with mean µ1i and the time spent
in the non-monitoring state is also an exponential random variable with mean µ0i .
Second, we assume that a user spends some time in consuming WiFi network
of other users in the community. Here again, we assume that each time a user i
accesses the Internet via someone else WiFi access point, the time spent online is
an exponential random variable with mean η1i and the time between accessing other
community member’s networks is also an exponential random variable with mean
η0i
2.
Moreover, when user i is accessing the Internet via the community network, the
probability that he accesses it via user j’s network is given by wij.
We also assume that time is divided into rounds of duration T . For each round,
we define the following metrics:
1. Demand: αi(t) is the amount of service that user i desires in round t, the
service he requires from the community’s network resources.
2. Service: γi(t) is the service that user i actually consumes in round t, including
the cheating service. Clearly, γi ≤ αi;
3. Income: βi(t) is the credits that user i accrues in time t by sharing his network
with other users in the system.
2while we assume exponential distribution for analysis, we show later via real-world trace driven
simulations that this assumption is not critical to the algorithms we investigate.
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We assume that a user’s demand αi is not a fixed quantity and is determined by
the user at the start of each round, based on prior experience with system, his income
etc. We further make the intuitive assumption that a user’s propensity to cheat is
a function of both his demand and his income. For example a user whose demand
is much larger than his income has a higher propensity to cheat as compared with
a user who has a lower demand when compared with his income. For the sake on






, αi > βi
0, αi ≤ βi
(4.1)
This is a justifiable assumption, since a user has no incentive to cheat and save his
credits when his income exceeds demand. This is because the credits earned in the Wi-
Sh system can only be used for Wi-Sh services and not for other commodities/services.
We now formulate the system as a WiFi sharing game as follows:
• Players: N users,
• Strategy Set: ∀i demand αi ≥ 0,
• Payoff Function: ∀i, Ui(αi, α−i) = γi.
In the WiFi sharing game, each user i’s objective is to maximize the payoff
(Ui(αi, α−i)), or say the networking service (γi) through properly adjusting the de-
mand rate (αi).
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4.4.1.1 Probability of being caught (pcij(i 6= j))
When user i is cheating under user j’s network (j 6= i), we are interested in the
probability (denoted as pcij) that user i is caught by user j.
Lemma 4.1 When a user i cheats under user j’s network, the probability that user




















, (i 6= j) (4.2)
Proof: Let random variable X0 denote the inter-monitoring duration of user j (the
WiFi AP owner), i.e., the duration between the end of the one monitoring session and
the start of the next monitoring session. Let Y1 be random variable which denotes
the session duration when user i uses another user’s network. Then conditioned on
the fact that user i is cheating (i.e., has not reported his consumption to the server),
user i is caught if (i) user j is actively monitoring the network when user i logs on, or
(ii) if user i logs on when user j is not monitoring the network, but user j’s residual
duration to switch to the monitoring state is shorter than user i’s network session.
Since we have assumed all these random variables are exponential, we can exploit the
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Note that the probability of being caught depends on the usage patterns of both
the consumer and the owner of the network. However this is fairly simple state
information that the centralized server can maintain easily based on actual usage
patterns (since users connect to the server whenever they connect to the network).
4.4.2 Pricing and Punishment mechanisms
In this section we investigate the design of appropriate pricing and punishment mech-
anisms, so that the users cannot gain from cheating. Initially, when a user i uses
another user j’s network, he is charged a price 1 per time unit (this can be extended
to pricing based on bytes transferred etc.), which user i pays for from the credits he
earns when others utilize his network. Assume at time t user i with price Pi(t) is
caught cheating by user j (i.e., user i does not report his consumption to the server),
then for the subsequent M time units during which the user i is active, he is charged
Pi(t) + ∆Pij. After honestly behaving for M active time units, user i’s price reverts
back to 1, i.e., we allow the user to rehabilitate himself. The choice of how a user is
charged when is caught cheating is critical. We now state the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.1 If ∆Pij satisfies the following condition,
∆Pij =









2 · (µ1j + µ0j)
, ω ≥ 0 (4.3)
the expected gain for any user i, cheating under another network j, is not positive.
Proof: For any user i, the expected gain rate for cheating under network j is
calculated as follows:
E(Gij) =







denotes the average service the user can obtain before being caught, which
































2 · (µ1j + µ0j)
(4.5)
Thus, to guarantee E(Gij) is not positive, ∆Pij should satisfy the following con-
dition:
∆Pij ≥
(1− pcij)η1i + η1i ′
pcijM
(4.6)
In this work, we set the punishment as:
∆Pij =
(1− pcij)η1i + η1i ′ + ω
pcijM
,where ω ≥ 0




≡ −ψ ≤ 0, ψ ≥ 0 (4.7)
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Therefore, we see that with the punishment mechanism designed as above, in the
long run, for any user i, the service rate he receives can not be larger than the rate




γi · wij (4.8)
The equality holds when all the consumers under user j’s network are not cheating
(i.e., all the consumers of user j are charged at unit rate), or ω = 0 (i.e., ψ = 0) in
equation 4.3.
4.4.3 Nash equilibrium
Since each user is only interested in maximizing his own service rate, we analyze the
Nash equilibrium of WiFi sharing game in this section.
First, we state the following Lemma.
Lemma 4.2 If α∗i = β
∗
i ,∀i, We have:




Proof: According to equation 4.1, ∀i, p∗i = 0, then, based on payoff definition, we
have, ∀i, γ∗i = Ui(α∗i , α∗−i) = α∗i . Moreover, combine the above results with equation







Theorem 4.2 Under the punishment mechanism defined in equation 4.3, the Nash
equilibrium α∗i ,∀i of the WiFi sharing game is: α∗i = β∗i ,∀i.
Proof:
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Case 1: for a particular user i, let α′i = α
∗


























Case 2: for a particular user i, let α′i = α
∗










−i)− Ui(α∗i , α∗−i) = α′i − α∗i < 0
However, multiple equilibriums exist in the WiFi sharing game, formally denoted as:
~α∗ = ~α∗ ·W∑
i α
∗
i ≤ N · C0
Here N ·C0 is the total credits in the community. So among all the equilibriums, the




i = N · C0.
We assume that each user i can only adjust the average online duration η1i (t)
to affect the consumption rate, instead of directly adjusting the exact consumption
rate αi(t). This is based on intuition on how users are likely to behave in real life.
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Moreover, we allow the users to have a demand rate slightly higher than their income
rate by δ > 0, so that the users are encouraged to consume as much as possible and
converge to the Pareto efficient equilibrium.
4.5 User and System Behavior
Real world behavior of users is unpredictable. The success of the Wi-Sh mechanism
critically depends on user behavior patterns. In this section, we attempt to answer
the following question. If one makes reasonable assumptions about user behavior,
then does the system converge to a stable and efficient solution?
4.5.1 Modeling User Behavior
In this section we make the following reasonable assumptions about user behavior.
First, when a user’s income exceeds his demand, then in the subsequent round, the
user increases his demand. On the other hand, if the user’s income is less than his
demand, then he reduces his demand in the subsequent round. In practice, we assume
that the user adjusts his demand by modifying the amount of time he spends in a
session when using other user’s networks. In other words, we assume that he increases
or decreases η1i which results in a change in αi
3.
The key question we need to address now is whether such a class of behaviors
can result in the system converging to the Pareto efficient Nash Equilibrium. This is
3each user i can only adjust the average online duration η1i (t) to affect the consumption rate,
instead of directly adjusting the exact consumption rate αi(t). This is based on intuition on how
users are likely to behave in real life
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especially critical since, as we have shown earlier, multiple Nash equilibria exist. As a
first step, for the sake of simplicity, assume that there are only two possible α values,
namely αH > αL that the user can choose from. Both demands are fair (equal across
all users), however assume that only a choice of αH is efficient (i.e., Pareto optimal)
in that no credits are left wasted.
For the purpose of analytical tractability, we first consider the following simple
user behavior model:
η1i (t+ 1) = ηH ,w.p.(1− ), βi(t)− αi(t) > 0,
η1i (t+ 1) = ηL,w.p.(1− ), αi(t)− βi(t) > δ (4.9)
where ηH > ηL and  > 0. This implicitly assumes that the user has only two demands
αH > αL. The intuition here is that when a user’s income is low, he keeps his demand
also low. If the income becomes high, then the user also increases his demand from
other users’ networks.
We first show that this simple user behavior model can be modeled as a population
coordination game which converges to the Pareto optimal solution in the long run
[99, 100].
We will show that this can be modeled as a population game in which each stage
game is a coordination game. Assume a population of N players and time is discretely
divided into rounds of duration T . In each round, pairs of players play with each other
(possibly several times). The game played by a pair of players is called a stage game.
The two important definitions, Coordination Game and Darwinian Property, and
one important theorem (Theorem 4.3), are presented below. The detailed explana-
98
tions and proofs can be found in Reference [99, 100].
Definition 4.1 Coordination Game: A stage game is called a coordination game if
the payoff table is shown in Table 4.1, 4. Clearly, this game have two pure strategy
II
s1 s2
I s1 a, a b, c
s2 c, b d, d
Table 4.1: A 2× 2 symmetric coordination game (a > d, a > c, d ≥ b)
equilibrium E1 ≡ (s1, s1) and E2 ≡ (s2, s2). Since a > d, E1 is the Pareto efficient
equilibrium.
Definition 4.2 Darwinian Property: Let zt ∈ 0, 1, . . . N denote the number of play-
ers using strategy s1 in round t. Let pii(t) be the expected pay-off when a player uses
strategy si. Then with  = 0 in user strategy described in equation 4.9, the strategies
are said to have the Darwinian property if,
sgn(E[zt+1|zt]− zt) = sgn(pi1(zt)− pi2(zt)), zt 6= 0, N (4.10)
Note sgn() stands for sign function.
Theorem 4.3 Consider a population game, whose stage game is a coordination game
and exhibits the Darwinian property. Assume that the evolution of zt is zt+1 = zt +
4Table 4.1 demonstrates user I’s and user II’s payoffs, when they alternatively choose the strategies
s1 and s2.
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xt − yt, where xt ∼ Bin(N − zt, ε), yt ∼ Bin(zt, ε) 5. Then, if there exists a z∗ such
that sign(pi1(zt)− pi2(zt)) = sign(zt − z∗), zt 6= 0, N , and z∗ < N2 , then the population
game converges to a solution where limt→∞ zt = N .
4.5.2 WiFi Sharing Game
In this section, we focus on the WiFi population game based on the behavior described
in Equation 4.9. First consider a population of size N = 2. We can show that this is
a coordination game.
Lemma 4.3 The 2 × 2 symmetric WiFi sharing game is a 2 × 2 symmetric coordi-
nation game.
Proof: The 2× 2 symmetric WiFi sharing game, has two users, I and II, and each
user has two strategies, αH = a, αL = d, (a > d). The payoff table is as follows:
1. αI = αII = a
βI = αII = a, βII = αI = a
pI = 0, pII = 0
⇒ γI = a, γII = a (4.11)
This is also a Nash equilibrium solution.
2. αI = a, αII = d
βI = αII = d, βII = min{αI , βI} = d
pI = 1− d
a
> 0, pII = 0
5Note Bin() stands for Binomial distribution)
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⇒
γI = a · (1− pI) + a · pIE(GI,II)
= d+ (a− d)E(GI,II) ≤ d,
according to equation 4.7
γII = d < a
3. αI = αII = d, similar to case 1;
4. αI = d, αII = a, similar to case 2.
So the 2× 2 symmetric WiFi sharing game shown in Table 4.2 is a 2× 2 symmetric
coordination game shown in Table 4.1.
II
αH αL
I αH a, a b, d
αL d, b d, d
Table 4.2: A one stage 2 × 2 symmetric WiFi sharing game
(a > d, b = d+ (a− d)E(GI,II) ≤ d)
Lemma 4.4 With the punishment mechanism ∆Pij defined in equation 4.3, where
ω = 0 and user behavior defined in equation 4.9, where δ = (a − d), the Darwinian
property is satisfied.
Proof: Let zt be the number of users choosing demand rate αH = a in round t.
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The average pay-off γH(zt), γL(zt), for users with demand rates αH , αL respec-
tively is given by:
γH(zt) =
zt − 1
N − 1 · a+
N − zt
N − 1 · b
γL(zt) =
zt
N − 1 · d+
N − zt − 1
N − 1 · d = d
(4.12)
Since, the utility gain is given by the amount of service obtained minus the pay-
ment made, for the users who select strategy αH , the price paid is given by
γH(zt)− αH · pI · E(GI,II) = γH(zt) + (a− d)ψ (4.13)
Therefore, when ω = 0 (i.e., ψ = 0), βi(zt), i = H,L, the average income rate of
a user with demand rate αi, i = H,L, is given by:
βH(zt) =
zt − 1
N − 1 · γH(zt) +
N − zt
N − 1 · γL(zt)
βL(zt) =
zt
N − 1 · γH(zt) +
N − zt − 1
N − 1 · γL(zt)
(4.14)
Therefore, we have:
1. when γH(zt) > γL(zt), i.e., γH(zt) > d
αH(zt)− βH(zt) = a− βH(zt) < (a− d) ≡ δ
βL(zt)− αL(zt) = βL(zt)− d > 0
2. when γH(zt) < γL(zt), i.e., γH(zt) < d, similarly,
αH(zt)− βH(zt) > (a− d) ≡ δ
βL(zt)− αL(zt) < 0
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Thus, users’ behavior satisfies the Darwinian property.
Therefore, if we show the existence of a z∗ < N
2
such that sign(piH(zt)−piL(zt)) =
sign(zt − z∗), we are done. Since z∗ = N(d− b) + a− d
a− c+ d− b , clearly, when ω = 0,
z∗ < N
2
,∀N > 2. Therefore by Theorem 4.3, with user behavior as defined in equation
4.9, the system converges to the optimal solution.
Given that even the simple models seem to have provably attractive properties,
we now investigate the performance of a more practical and reasonable user behavior
model as described below.
∆i(t− 1) = βi(t− 1)− αi(t− 1) (4.15)
η1i (t) = η
1
i (t− 1) + ε ·∆i(t− 1),∆i(t− 1) > 0
η1i (t) = η
1
i (t− 1) + ε ·∆i(t− 1),∆i(t− 1) < −δ
where ε, δ > 0 are the design parameters. ε defines the increasing/decreasing speed
and δ defines the degree we encourage users’ demands higher than their incomes.
Once again the intuition here is that the demand is increased whenever the income
exceeds demand. On the other hand we only decrement demand when the difference
between income and demand exceeds a certain threshold δ. We investigate this via
extensive synthetic and trace-driven simulations based on real world data.
4.6 Simulations
In this section, we investigate the convergence of WiFi sharing game with N( 2)
users where the demand can take any positive value on the real life. We investigate
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the impact of symmetric and asymmetric access patterns.
Simulation design: We have a total of 100 users. Each user’s monitoring and
consumption activity follows the definition in Section 4.4 with µ1i = 10, µ
0
i = 50, η
1
i =
10, η0i = 100. Each user can dynamically adjust the demand according to the behavior
model defined in equation 4.15 with ε = 0.2, δ = 10. The punishment mechanism






j are estimated through users’
previous activities. Initially, the networking price is 1 credit/time unit and each user
is given 500 credits.
Results: In Fig.4.2 and 4.3 , we show results when the access patterns are symmetric,
wij = 1/99,∀i, j, i 6= j. In Fig. 4.4 and 4.5, users have asymmetric access patterns. In
this simulation we assume ∀i, wi,j = 2wi,k, j ∈ 1, . . . 50, k ∈ 51, . . . , 100, i 6= j, i 6= k.
In both cases (Fig. 4.2,4.3 and 4.4,4.5 ), we can see that users converge to a long
run equilibrium, where the users’ average service rates are stochastically stable as
shown in Fig. 4.2(a) and 4.4(a). Users’ demands are slightly higher (related to δ)
than the incomes, as shown in Fig. 4.2(b) and 4.4(b). This helps the users go to the
more efficient equilibrium. However, this slight difference also makes the users cheat
with a small probability, resulting in price oscillations as shown in Fig. 4.3(b) and
4.5(b), and a small negative gain shown in 4.3(a) and 4.5(a).
Moreover, for the users with asymmetric access patterns, the results in Fig. 4.4
and 4.5 show that users associated with more popular access points can also obtain
more service. An immediate question that arises is whether this is fair, i.e., should
users be penalized due to the fact that the access points they own are not located in
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popular hot spots? We will revisit this issue in Section 4.8.
4.7 Experiments with Real Data
Our simulation results in Section 4.6 validate the fact that our system converges
to a stable behavior with the modeling assumptions we have made. In this section
we investigate whether the system still converges to a stable set of solutions when
the modeling assumptions we have made are relaxed (i.e., exponential access and
monitoring patterns etc.). We investigate this via trace driven simulations on real
data.
Simulation Design: We use a real WiFi campus network data set to emulate users’
networking activities in the Wi-Sh community. The data set, obtained from [101], is
a system log from 2005-09-01 to 2006-10-04, for over 450 access points and several
thousand students at Dartmouth College. Among them, we select 59 access points
and 1614 students, and use the system logs related to them in our simulation.
We randomly combine each access point with several students to form a group,
which, as a whole, is regarded as a Wi-Sh user. Each Wi-Sh user earns credits when
other users use his access point and pays credits when he uses other users’ access
points. Users’ monitoring activities also follow the traced system log. When the
users are online, they are also assumed to be monitoring their own access point,
otherwise, they are not monitoring.
In the simulation, time is measured by seconds. The total simulation time ranges
from 2005-9-1,16:13:26 to 2006-6-18,8:36:10, a total of 25028564 seconds. Time is
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divided into rounds and each round duration is one week (3600 × 24 × 7 seconds).
Initially, the networking price is 1 credit/sec, and each user has 3600× 24× 7 credits.
The punishment mechanism defined in equation 4.3 is applied, whereM = 3600×






j are estimated through users’ previous networking history.
The users’ cheating probability pi follow the equation 4.1.
Results:
We select three types of typical users to illustrate our results, namely users with
income equal to, greater than and less than demand. We see that three types of
equilibria emerge depending on the type of user. For users with income less than
demand, they consistently end up cheating (i.e., not reporting) and eventually their
price becomes arbitrarily high. This shows that the system behavior does not critically
depend on assumptions such as the exponential nature of access and monitoring
activities. What really matters are the expected duration for monitoring and access.
Once again we see that there is a potential fairness issue. We discuss this in further
detail in Section 4.8.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose a cooperation incentivizing solution in WCNs. This
solution requires no sophisticated hardware, instead it only requires users to download
a client software on to their PCs. While the solution appears simple it raises several
issues of incentivizing users to share their bandwidth and also issues of preventing
users from cheating behaviors which give them an unfair advantage. In this work, we
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propose a system and solution which (i) requires only software downloads on PCs, (ii)
is robust to tampering of the software, and intermittent monitoring of an access point
by the owner, (iii) a credit based mechanism whereby users earn credits for sharing
bandwidth and punishment and pricing mechanism whereby users are charged at a
higher price whenever they are caught misbehaving. By making simple but plausible
assumptions about user behavior, we show via analysis and extensive simulations that
the system converges to a Pareto Optimal Nash equilibrium. We further validate our
system model, by running trace driven simulations on real world data. We believe
that the solution provided by Wi-Sh is an attractive and more credible alternative to
solutions such as FON.
However, there are two key issues which require further thought and discussion.
MAC Address Spoofing: First, our solution is not robust to MAC address spoof-
ing. For example if a user tampered with the client side software to obtain the
mapping between access point MAC addresses and WEP keys, he could use this to
repeatedly access the network and circumvent the blacklisting mechanism via MAC
address spoofing. The community users can also use MAC address spoofing to avoid
punishment, i.e., cheating under others’ APs with an untraceable MAC address. How-
ever, both of them will be rejected immediately after the AP owners start monitoring.
Fairness: Second is the issue of fairness. Due to the tyranny of geography, the access
point which a user owns may be located in a remote and unpopular location. Our
system design and simulation results show that such a user will obtain no more service
than he shares. This could be construed as being unfair to the user. One solution is to
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make users pay real money for bandwidth that they require in addition to the income
earned. An alternative is to keep track of the duration for which the Wi-Sh user
makes his access point available for sharing and give him credit for it irrespective of
actual usage by other users. However this will require robust monitoring mechanisms
to ensure that the user is actually sharing his access points at all points of time.
In the next chapter, we will further investigate this issue and solve the fairness
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Figure 4.7: Real world users (Part II)
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Chapter 5
WiFi Sharing Game with Priority Pricing
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there exists fairness problem in the Wi-Sh system. In
this chapter, we provide a priority pricing mechanism on the Wi-Sh system and solve
the fairness problem. The new system is named as “PP-WiSh System”.
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we introduce Wi-Sh, a simple, robust and credit-based WiFi sharing
system. Wi-Sh is a simple solution like Whisher, which only requires a client side
software on the user’s personal computer. Wi-Sh provides properly designed report-
ing, monitoring and punishment mechanisms, to make sure this simple solution is
robust to software tampering. Wi-Sh provides a credit-based system, where a user
will obtain no more service than he shares, so users are incentivized to share as much
as possible.
However, the credit-based system may cause fairness problems. Some users (“rich
users”), located in hot spots may accumulate more credits than they need; while some
other users (“poor users”), located in unpopular areas, may not get enough credits to
fulfill their basic networking demands. It is unfair for the poor users to be punished,
simply due to the tyranny of geography. Moreover, the unfairness may finally cause
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network sharing activities to shrink. This is because poor users will significantly
decrease their networking activities due to the lack of credits. If one assumes a
typical 80-20 rule where 20% of users receive 80% of requests from other users (most
of them from users located in unpopular places), then eventually these users will also
eventually run out of credits resulting in an undesirable equilibrium. Therefore, to
drive the system towards a desirable equilibrium, it is important to solve the fairness
problem.
In this chapter, our goal is to design a solution which can solve the fairness prob-
lem in a credit-based WiFi sharing community. This solution should make sure that
the basic networking demands of users in bad locations can be completely fulfilled.
Moreover, this solution should be acceptable to all the users, both poor and rich, and
all the users are incentivized to follow this solution.
We arrange the rest of this chapter as follows:
(i) We propose a WiFi Sharing system with Priority Pricing (“PP-WiSh”). The
priority pricing mechanism is provided to solve the fairness problem. In the priority
pricing mechanism, users have the option to pay a higher price for service at another
user’s access point. This allows the user to ensure that they obtain service with a
lower delay. This allows users in poor geographic locations to earn credits at a higher
rate. When these users visit all other locations, they pay the lowest possible price,
thereby obtaining service whenever required but at the expense of delay. Conversely
users whose access points are located in hot-spots, can receive service with lower delay
by paying a higher price when roaming.
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Note that PP-WiSh is a client side software solution without any modifications
required on the access points. In PP-WiSh, the cheating prevention mechanisms are
more complete and robust, compared with WiSh system. See Section 5.2.
(ii)We theoretically analyze cheating behaviors and design robust punishment mecha-
nisms. We formulate the WiFi sharing problem as a distributed optimization problem,
where each user is maximizing his utility through adjusting the average credits paid
per packet, i.e., the average price. We theoretically obtain the user’s equilibrium
prices so that all user’s demands are satisfied and their utilities are maximized. See
Section 5.3. Furthermore, we prove that all the users, with assumed rational and
intelligent behaviors, converge to the equilibrium prices Section 5.4.2.
(iii) Finally to validate that our analysis is not critically valid on the assumptions
we make, we run simulations on real world trace data. We validate the equilibrium
convergence and system performance improvements through experiments using this
data. See 5.5.
5.2 System Design
The PP-WiSh system improves upon the Wi-Sh system in Chapter 4. Specifically, the
PP-WiSh architecture is more robust to a wider variety of cheating behaviors. Second,
the PP-WiSh introduces a priority pricing mechanism which significantly improves the











Figure 5.1: The architecture of PP-WiSh System
of geographic location, while trading off this improved access for delay. We give a
brief overview of the architecture and dwell on the aspects which are different from
the original Wi-Sh system. Please refer to Chapter 4 for the motivation and details
of the original architecture.
5.2.1 Overview:
Recall from Chapter 4 that our goal is to design a client side software solution which
is robust, credit based and efficient. We do not want a solution which resides on the
user’s access point, since it will either require the user to upgrade his access point
incurring costs (e.g., FON) or upgrade his firmware which is beyond the technical
know how of most laymen. The PP-WiSh system consists of two aspects, the first a
client software solution and the second a server. The client’s software is responsible for
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access, reporting, monitoring and MAC address filtering. The server is responsible for
managing user accounts, accounting and blacklisting rogue users. While we assume
that the server is secure, we make no assumption that the client software cannot
be compromised. We briefly mention what the client side and server side functions
mean. Access is the authentication and log in mechanism that the client side software
uses whenever the user accesses some other user’s access point. Once a user starts
using another user’s access point, he reports his usage to the central server. This
could either be in terms of the time spent at the other user’s access point or the
number of bytes transmitted and received. While the user is online (either on his
home network or on another user’s network), the client software remotely monitors
the home network to see which users are online. When monitoring his home network,
if user A finds that user B is accessing his network, he reports the presence of the user
and his usage to the server. This step is crucial. Note that we make no assumptions
that the client software is not compromised. It is entirely possible that, once a user
accesses another users network, he does not report his usage accurately. Also note
that we assume that a user can monitor his network only via his client software when
he is online. This implies that the monitoring mechanism is intermittent, resulting
in incentives for cheating behavior. The server keeps track of users who cheat and
appropriately charges them a different price for a certain punishment duration. The
server can also blacklist repeated misbehaving users or users who are not registered
by sending out their MAC addresses to all clients. The clients then automatically
apply MAC address filters for these users at their access points. For more details on
these functions and their details, please refer to Chapter 4.
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We now dwell on two aspects which are a significant departure from the earlier
system, namely the types of cheating behaviors possible and the priority pricing
mechanism.
5.2.2 Cheating Behaviors
To analyze user’s cheating behaviors, we need to emphasize the following practical
considerations.
• Users have full control of their access points and are able to change any con-
figuration or information in their own access points at any time.
• Since PP-WiSh client is installed in user’s PCs as a client software, it is pos-
sible for example, for the users to have a hacked version where the reporting
mechanism is switched off.
Based on this, in PP-WiSh system, we mainly have the following two types of
cheating behaviors. We also generally introduce the punishment, enforced on each
type of cheaters to prevent cheating. Later in Section 5.3.2, we will explain in details
and theoretically analyze these punishment mechanisms.
Not Reporting (Type I): After user u successfully connects to Internet through
the access point of user v, user u can deliberately turn off his PP-WiSh client and stop
reporting his usage to PP-WiSh server obtaining free service. However, if user v is
currently monitoring his access point, user u, will be caught. For several subsequent
accesses (details to follow), user u will be punished by being charged at a higher rate
for access than other honest users.
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False Reporting (Type II):We now turn our attention to a type of cheating behav-
ior from the network service provider’s point of view. Consider a user u who knows
that a user v regularly accesses his (i.e., u’s) network. Then user u can deliberately
modify his access point and list user v as accessing his network (i.e., u’s network)
when v is not on the network. u then turns on his PP-Wish client which reports v as
accessing u’s network. The server assumes that v has accessed u’s network without
reporting it and will punish v by charging him at a higher rate for subsequent service.
Since v frequently accesses u’s network, u can earn credits at a higher rate from such
malicious behavior. However, if user v is accessing some other user’s network when
u mis-reports v’s usage, then u’s cheating behavior is revealed.
In addition, the AP owners are not allowed to report the users who were using
his AP long long time ago (e.g. 2 days ago) to the central server through checking
historical router logs, since this may encourage AP owner’s cheating behaviors. The
AP owner may find out the pattern of some user’s networking activities, and thus
forge some historical router logs accordingly to falsely report this user to the central
server, so that the AP owner can earn more credits from this user in the future. At
the same time, the real time monitoring and reporting makes it more costly for the
AP owner to falsely report, since the real time monitoring requires the AP owner to




The key element which we add into the system is priority pricing. The main drawback
of the WiSh system was that it resulted in poor access opportunities for users whose
access points were housed in un-popular locations. In the WiSh system, each time
a user u accessed another user v’s access point (assuming he is honest), paid v at
a constant rate and u received a constant type of service. As a consequence, if v’s
access point was located in a remote region with few visitors, then he would earn very
few credits over time, resulting in poor access to network services when v roams. On
the other hand a rich user u who has earned a large amount of credit, had no means
obtain a better quality of service by paying a higher price. PP-WiSh addresses both
these drawback by introducing priority pricing. The key idea is that a user can obtain
different levels of service based on the price he is willing to pay. These levels of service
could be introduced via priority queueing mechanism at the access point which uses
a priority queue instead of a FIFO queue to serve users. This could be implemented
via the 802.11e standard which allows the access point to provide different quality of
service to different users. Therefore users who pay a higher amount will perceive less
delay compared to users who pay a lower amount. Consequently, users whose access
points are located in poor geographic can earn at a higher rate whenever high priority
users visit them and they can in turn use this to always obtain network service when
they roam by always opting for the lowest priority level of service.
We have a total of L priority levels, from 1 to L. We assume that level 1 has the
lowest priority level and level L has the highest priority. Let P (i), 1 ≤ i ≤ L be the
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price associated with level i, then P (1) < P (2) < . . . < P (L). The lowest priority
level, level 1, has the lowest price, one credit per packet, i.e., P (1) = 1. The level 0,
with the higher priority than all the L priority levels, is reserved for the home users.
Users are allowed to choose the priority level for their networking service and
pay the corresponding price. We divide the time into rounds, and each round has a
constant duration, e.g., one day, 12 hours etc. Users are only allowed to change their
priority level (or say the networking price) at the beginning of each round. All the
users choices on pricing are stored and updated in the central server.
5.3 System Modelling
In this section, we provide an analytical framework for the PP-WiSh system. The
goal is to provide insights on the factors affecting the WiFi sharing activities in the
community.
5.3.1 Assumptions and Preliminaries
We assume there are M members and N access points in the community. All the
access points are owned by community members and a single access point can be
owned by multiple members in the same household, thus we have M ≥ N . The
members with the owned access point constitute as a user. Each user i performs two
independent functions. First, each user i spends some time monitoring his network.
We assume that the time spent in the monitoring state is defined by an exponential
random variable with mean µ1i and the time spent in the non-monitoring state is also
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an exponential random variable with mean µ0i .
Second, each user i spends some time in consuming WiFi network resources of
other users in the community. Each user i’s networking activity under AP j 6= i is
an independent process. We assume that the time spent under user j’s network is
defined by an exponential random variable with mean oij and the time spent away
from user j’s network is an exponential random variable with mean fij.
For all the online sessions, the average packet arrival rate is λ. Thus, the average
demand rate for user i under AP j, i.e., the average number of packets user i demands










1, are constant for any user i under any AP j, so
the average rate demanded nij is also constant. This assumption is justified by the
real world user demands shown in Figure 5.2. After enough long time, all the users’
demands reach a stable state and each user almost has constant demand.
Remark 1 Note that while the assumption that all durations are exponential in na-
ture is useful for deriving some meaningful insights, our simulation results show that
the performance of the system is not critically dependent on this assumption.
5.3.2 Punishment Mechanism
As stated earlier, there are two types of cheating behaviors, Type I (i.e., not reporting)
and Type II (i.e., falsely reporting). As indicated earlier, we impose a punishment



























Rounds (around 2.3 days per round)
Figure 5.2: Real World User Demands Rate in a WiFi campus network
mechanism to prevent such malicious behavior. If a user u resorts to Type I behavior,
then we ensure that he is punished by charging him at a higher rate for future network
access for a duration T . This higher rate of charging is chosen such that on an average,
the user can not gain from Type I behavior. If a user u resorts to Type II behavior
by falsely reporting user v as accessing his network service and is caught, then a
certain number of credits are transferred from user u to user v. The number of
credits transferred is appropriately chosen so that on an average user u has nothing
to gain from such behavior. We formally analyze the punishment mechanisms for the
two types of cheating behaviors below.
Type I (not reporting): Once the users are caught not reporting, they are punished
for a duration T . We denote by pni the excess price that the user has to pay over
his regular price. If a user i is caught not reporting under AP j, then we set pni =
pni+∆PNij, where ∆PNij is the excess price imposed on user i for T time units for
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cheating user j. If we denote the priority level of user i as li and the corresponding
price is P (li), the actual price user i paid is P (li) + pni.
As in Chapter 4, conditioned on the event that user i is cheating user j (i.e., by















Let us now consider the amount of excess service user i obtains by cheating user
j with probability pcij. We denote by o
′
ij the amount of service that user i obtains
without being caught. Therefore user i’s expected service is ((1− pcij)oij + o′ij). The
penalty for being caught is pcij(T∆PNij). Since user i accesses user j’s access point
every oij + fij time units on average, from renewal reward type arguments, we obtain
the gain rate E(G1ij) as,
E(G1ij) =
(
(1− pcij)oij + oij ′










2 · (µ1j + µ0j)
(5.4)
Therefore in order to ensure that no user gains from Type I cheating, we should
ensure that:
∆PNij ≥
(1− pcij)oij + oij ′
pcijT
× λr ⇒ E(G1ij) ≤ 0 (5.5)
Note that since the server collects all statistics of oij, fij etc., it can easily compute
these quantities.
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False reporting (Type II): If a user i is caught falsely reporting the use of his
network by user j, then a sum Cij is transferred from user i to j. Let probability
pc2ij denote the probability that user j is on another network. In other words, with










Here, Mj is the number of members under user j, and we assume that each member
of user j has the same probability online when user j is online. Based on this, we can
obtain the expected gain rate for user i to falsely report user j as follows,
E(G2ij) =







Therefore, to make sure that user i cannot gain from falsely reporting user j, Cij
should satisfy the following condition:
Cij ≥




⇒ E(G2ij) ≤ 0 (5.8)
Therefore, under the punishment mechanisms defined in equation 5.5 and 5.8, we





ij) ≤ 0 (5.9)
5.3.3 Utility Maximization
We formulate the WiFi sharing problem as a utility maximization problem for each
user.
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For any user i, we define the following parameters, to measure user’s networking
activities under the other users’ APs2:








• Average Price (pi): the average credits paid for per packet sent out (the pun-
ishment not included);
• Average Delay (di): the average delay per packet incurred;
• Cheating Probability (pci): the probability user i cheats, i.e., when user i
accesses the access point of any other user, with probability pci user i will not
report his usage; when user i is monitoring his access point, with probability
pci user j will falsely report to the server that another user is using his access
point.
We assume that, for any user i, the probability that he cheats is proportional
















Before formulating the user’s utility function, we make the following observation.
The user’s primary objective is to have all his demands fulfilled, i.e., whenever a user
2in this chapter, we use −i to denote the set of all the other users except user i.
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wishes to access any other user’s network and transmit packets over it, all his session
requests must be accepted and his packets transported over the network. If all of the
user’s demands are met and if the user has excess credits to spare, he can utilize these
excess credits to obtain better quality of service. Therefore, we formulate the user’s
utility function Ui as follows:
Ui = W · ηi + w · 1
di
· I{ηi=1}, (W,w > 0) (5.11)
Here, W and w are some constants, and
I{ηi=1} =

1, (ηi = 1)
0, (0 ≤ ηi < 1)
Each user i aims to maximize his utility Ui by appropriately adjusting the price
he is willing to pay, pi. Roughly speaking, if all the user’s demands are not being
fulfilled, then the user will reduce his price, while if it is all being satisfied, then the
user pays a higher price to reduce his delay.
5.3.3.1 Demand









































First, we establish that when all other users keep their prices equal, given that each
access point resorts to priority queueing, user i’s delay decreases when he increases
the price he is willing to pay.
Lemma 5.1 For each user i, the expected average delay E(di) decreases as the aver-
age price pi he is willing to pay increases, under the condition that all the other user’s
average prices remains constant.
Proof: Let us define that for any user i,
• the expected number of users in the same access point with user i is Ni;
• the expected number of users with the average price higher than user i is
N+i (pi);
• the expected number of users with the average price equal to user i is N=i (pi).
According to the priority queuing delay equation in [102], we have:
di =
Ni · λr · 2µ2s
2(1− λr
µs
N+i (pi))(1− λrµs (N+i (pi) +N=i (pi)))
(5.15)
Since all the others’ prices do not change, as pi increases, both N
+
i (pi) and (N
+
i (pi)+
N=i (pi)) are decreasing, thus di is decreasing.
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According to Lemma 5.1, we denote user’s delay as,
1
di
= f(pi, p−i) (5.16)
here, f(pi, p−i) is monotonically increasing with pi increases, when p−i are constant.
Therefore, each user i’s utility maximization problem is formulated as follows,
∀i,max
pi














We now show that given each individual user’s utility function, there is a fairly simple
equilibrium solution where no user has an incentive to change his price.
Theorem 5.1 The utility maximization and equilibrium solution ~p∗ for all the users








With this price, we have ∀i, pc∗i = 0 and ∀i, η∗i = 1,
1
d∗i
= f(p∗i , p
∗
−i) so that,
U∗i = W + w · f(p∗i , p∗−i) (5.19)
Proof: For any user i, if he changes price from p∗i to p
′
i 6= p∗i , when all the other
users’ prices keep constant, we have the following case:
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p∗jnji ⇒ pc′i > 0,∀j ∈ {−i}, pc′j = 0























η′i ≤ ηUPPERi < 1⇒ U ′i = Wη′i < U∗i (5.21)









p∗jnji ⇒ pc′i = 0







































It means no one can further improve the utility, thus the price ~p∗ is the equilibrium
price.
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Moreover, according to equation 5.18, the equilibrium price ~p∗ is not unique. Any
price ~p = δ · ~p∗(δ ∈ (0,+∞)), that satisfies equation 5.18 is an equilibrium price. But
all these equilibriums are equivalent for users’ utility. Firstly, in all the equilibriums,
the users’ demands are 100% fullfilled. Secondly, since all the users increase (δ > 1)
or decrease (0 < δ < 1) their price proportionally, users’ delay does not change. Thus,
all the users have the same utility in any equilibrium solution and in each equilibrium,
users’ utilities are maximized.
5.4 User Behaviors and System Convergence
In this section, we first model how users will behave as a function of their income and
expenditure. These models are well founded but not restrictive. Next, we investigate
whether users converge to the equilibrium under this broad class of behaviors.
5.4.1 User Behaviors
For any user i, at any time t > 0, we define:
• Total amount of credits spent: Mi(t), total credits earned (or say, income):
Ii(t), and the current credit: Ci(t);




E(Mi(t)) = t ·
∑
j∈−i





(nji · pj(t)− pcj · E(Gji(t)))
• Expected current credit:
E(Ci(t)) = Ci(0) + E(Ii(t))− E(Mi(t))
= Ci(0) + t
∑
j∈−i




(pcj · E(Gji(t)− pci · E(Gij(t))))
(5.23)
Moreover, we make the following reasonable assumptions about user behavior.
First, if user i earns more credits than he spends, then in the subsequent round, the
user increases his average priority price pi by choosing a higher priority level. On the
other hand, if user i earns less credits than he spends, then he reduces his average
priority price pi by choosing a lower priority level. Specifically, for any user i, at any
round t + 1, the average priority price change, i.e., ∆pi(t + 1) = pi(t + 1) − pi(t),
satisfy the following conditions:
∆pi(t+ 1)

> 0, (Ci(t) > Ci(0))
= 0, (Ci(t) = Ci(0))




Inspired from the work in [103], which studies the convergence to the market equi-
librium under the linear utility function, we show here that the users in PP-WiSh
system can converge to the equilibrium price.
First, at any time t, we classify the users as rich users (set A), balanced users (set
B) and poor users (set C) according to their average price and demands fulfilled, or
say the potential expenditures and incomes, i.e.,
∀i ∈ A,∑j∈−i pi(t)nij <∑j∈−i njipj(t)
∀i ∈ B,∑j∈−i pi(t)nij =∑j∈−i njipj(t)
∀i ∈ C,∑j∈−i pi(t)nij >∑j∈−i njipj(t)
(5.25)
Then, we use the concept of maximum deficiency [103]. The maximum deficiency in













The maximum deficiency is equal to the poor users’ total potential demands minus
total potential incomes, and is also equal to the rich users’ total potential income












the two definition in equations 5.26 are equivalent. Without the loss of generality, we
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Now we prove users’ convergence in Theorem 5.2.
Theorem 5.2 Under the modeling assumptions defined in Section 5.3.1 and behav-
iors assumption defined in Section 5.4.1 users in the PP-WiSh community converge
to the equilibrium defined in 5.18.
Proof: To analyze the behavior of each user i, we regard all the other users −i as
a single user j 6= i, and according to equation 5.23, we have user i’s expected credits
as:































Note that users update their prices, when they are rich(A), poor(C) or balanced(B)
as described earlier.
• ∀i ∈ A,∑k∈−i pi(t)nik <∑k∈−i nkipk(t)
⇒ pi(t)nij < njipj(t)⇒ pci = 0, pcj > 0
∀i, j, E(Gij(t)) < 0

⇒ E(Ci(t)) > Ci(0)⇒ E(∆pi(t)) > 0
• ∀i ∈ B,∑k∈−i pi(t)nik =∑k∈−i nkipk(t)
pi(t)nij = njipj(t)⇒ pci = 0, pcj = 0
∀i, j, E(Gij(t)) < 0

⇒ E(Ci(t)) = Ci(0)⇒ E(∆pi(t)) = 0
• ∀i ∈ C,∑k∈−i pi(t)nik >∑k∈−i nkipk(t)
pi(t)nij > njipj(t)⇒ pci > 0, pcj < 0
∀i, j, E(Gij(t)) < 0

⇒ E(Ci(t)) < Ci(0)⇒ E(∆pi(t)) < 0







−nkcE(∆pk(t))] < 0 (5.29)
In other words the drift in deficiency is negative and will drive the drift towards zero.
We leave out a more formal statement of this fact in the interest of brevity. Clearly,
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when the deficiency is zero, we have:







⇒ E(Ci(t)) = Ci(0)⇒ E(∆pi(t)) = 0 (5.30)
and according to equation 5.18 and 5.26, we can see that when D(t) = 0, the obtained
price solution is the equilibrium solution.
5.5 Experiments
In this section, we consider real world data sets and investigate whether the system
converges to the appropriate equilibrium when the the analytical assumptions made
in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.4.1 are relaxed.
5.5.1 Simulation Design
We use a real WiFi campus network data set to emulate users’ networking activities
in the PP-WiSh community. The data set, obtained from [101], is a system log from
2005-09-01 to 2006-10-04, for over 450 access points and several thousand students at
Dartmouth College. Among them, we select 59 access points and 1614 students, and
use the system logs related to them in our simulation. We randomly associate several
students with each access point (see 5.3). Users’ demands are shown in Fig. 5.2.
Each user earns credits when other users use his access point and pays credits
when he uses other users’ access points. Note, since each user includes a number
of real students, a user could be simultaneously associated with a number of access
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points. Users are rejected if they do not have any credits left in their accounts.
The networking and priority queuing part are simulated using the network simula-
tor OMNET++ [104]. During the user’s online session, each user’s packets follow the
M/M/1 model [102], with the average arrival rate 1
20 seconds
and the average service
rate 1
1.5 seconds
. For the priority queuing, we have a total of three levels with price
as 5, 2, 1 credits/packet respectively and users’ price adjustment behaviors follow the
equation 5.24. Users’ cheating probability follows equation 5.10. The punishment
mechanisms follow equation 5.5 and 5.8, with T = 60000 seconds.
In the simulation, time is measured by seconds. The total simulation time ranges
from 2005-9-1,16:13:26 to 2006-6-18,8:36:10, a total of 25028564 seconds. The whole
timeline is divided into rounds and each round duration is 200000 seconds, around
2.3 days. Initially, all the users choose the lowest priority level, and each user has
200000 credits.
5.5.2 Results
As shown in Fig. 5.3 and 5.4, we can see that both users’ average service rate
and average price (i.e., average credits paid per packet) gradually converge to the
equilibrium after all the users’ demands reach the stable state (Fig. 5.2). In the Stage
I (round 0 to 60), since their demands have not converged (Fig. 5.2), users receive
poor service (Fig. 5.3), tend to cheat a lot, and are punished by increased prices (Fig.
5.4). Then, in Stage II (round 60 to 120), users’ demands reach a stable state, and
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Figure 5.6: Average Delay (seconds/pkt) and Average Price (punishment
included)
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rate also reach a stable state and compared with users’ demands in Fig. 5.2 most of
users’ demands are fulfilled.
Then, we investigate users’ amount of demand fulfilled and delay performance.
In both Fig. 5.5 and 5.6, users are arranged in increasing order of average price, i.e.,
from user 1 to user 59, user’s average price is increasing (shown in Fig. 5.6). As
shown in Fig. 5.5, in PP-WiSh most users achieve more than 80% of their demands
are fulfilled and the part of unfulfilled demands are mostly caused by the start-up
phase in Stage I (round 0 to 60). Compared with the Wi-Sh system in Chapter 4, in
PP-WiSh system, the percentage of demand fulfilled is greatly improved, especially
for poor users. For the rich users, in PP-WiSh system, their demands are typically
fulfilled 100% and they experience shorter delay compared with the poor users. This
is shown in Fig. 5.6.
These results are further demonstrated in Table 5.1, where we select six users and
show the percentage of demand fulfilled and delay experienced under both PP-WiSh
and Wi-Sh systems. Among these users, the first three users (A, B, and C) are rich
users, paying high average price, and the other three users (D, E and F) are poor users,
paying low average price. For users A, B and C 100% of their demands are fulfilled
under both Wi-Sh and PP-WiSh. For users D, E and F, the fraction of demands met
is greatly improved in PP-WiSh system compared to Wi-Sh. This is especially true
for user F, whose unsatisfied demand goes down from 31% to 0%. Next, we study
users’ delay performance. Users A, B and C have slightly decreased delay and all
users D, E and F have greatly increased delay. We know that in PP-WiSh system a
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Table 5.1: Demand Fullfilled and Average Delay Performance from six
users under PP-WiSh and Wi-Sh Systems
Users A B C D E F
Average Price 4.0694 4.2217 4.5944 1.6970 2.0732 2.1100
PP-WiSh (Demand Fullfilled) 1 1 1 0.63598 0.80544 1.00000
Wi-Sh (Demand Fullfilled) 1 1 1 0.50302 0.49397 0.69029
Inc/Dec (Demand Fullfilled) 0 0 0 0.13295 0.31147 0.30971
PP-WiSh (Average Delay) 2.4245 2.2020 2.1285 6.0018 5.1260 4.7432
Wi-Sh (Average Delay) 2.7265 2.3634 2.2856 3.6835 3.1293 2.3856
Inc/Dec (Average Delay) -0.30202 -0.16143 -0.15702 2.3183 1.9967 2.3576
larger fraction of demand is fulfilled, i.e., the total packets transmitted in PP-WiSh
is much larger than in the Wi-Sh system. Therefore the overall average delay in
PP-WiSh must be larger then the one in Wi-Sh. The increased delay in PP-WiSh is
mostly imposed on the poor users, but in return most of their demand is fulfilled. For
the rich users, although they only obtain slightly decreased delay compared with the
ones in Wi-Sh, their delay is much shorter than the poor users’ delay in PP-WiSh.
Therefore, in PP-WiSh the rich users still have strong incentive to pay high price for
the prioritized service.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide PP-WiSh system to solve the fairness problem in the
credit-based WiFi sharing community. PP-WiSh system can effectively prevent un-
fair punishment imposed on users located in unpopular areas and allows all the users
to have their demands satisfied completely. PP-WiSh is also a self incentivized sys-
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tem, in which all the users have their utility maximized and converge to equilibrium.
Moreover, both convergence and performance improvement of PP-WiSh system are
validated through theoretical analysis and experiments using real world data.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In the past decades, wireless networks have greatly improved and the current trends
are towards self-organized, decentralized and energy efficient networks. Furthermore
with networks coming into everyone daily life, more and more human behaviors are
involved in the modern networks. With this background, game theory, as a study
of selfish players’ behaviors and the conflicts in the decision making processes, can
frequently be applied to solve wireless network issues. The successful examples are
the power control in cellular networks, the selfish routing problem, the cooperation
incentivizing problem in ad hoc networks, and so on. Inspired from the previous work,
we applied game theory to study several important issues in wireless sensor networks
and wireless community networks.
Firstly, we studied the coverage problem in WSNs. Here, we applied game theo-
retic model to investigate the sensor nodes’ distributed behaviors, instead of the well
studied selfish behaviors in the previous work. Similar to the selfish behaviors, the
distributed behaviors may also cause network performance degradation. In the Set
K-cover problem, since each sensor node chooses the cover based on the local infor-
mation, i.e., its neighbors’ covers, the whole network may end up in a sub-optimal
solution, and the so-called price of anarchy appears. However, different from selfish
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behaviors, which is determined by the users’ preferences, the different behaviors can
be properly configured by the network designers to serve the global objective and
maximally approach the optimal result. In this coverage game, we designed each
sensor node’s payoff function as the region it covers by its own in the selected cover.
This configuration guarantees that once each node unilaterally changes covers to in-
crease its payoff, it will also proportionally increase the network coverage. It also
guarantees that in any Nash equilibrium solution, the network coverage cannot be
further improved by any distributed behavior, and the optimal solution is a Nash
equilibrium. However, if we configured each node’s payoff function in another way,
we may not obtain such good results. All in all, distributed behaviors may cause the
decision making conflict, as the selfish users, but distributed behaviors are partially
controllable and can be properly adjusted to serve the global objective. Hence, in fu-
ture it will be very interesting to look at this unique feature of distributed behaviors
and utilize them to solve more problems in wireless networks.
Next, we studied the cooperation incentivizing mechanism in wireless commu-
nity networks. Motivated by the fact that WiFi sharing community has already
shown great potential in the wireless market, but most plans rarely have a coopera-
tion scheme, we set out to provide a simple, practical and robust community WiFi
sharing mechanism. With a lot of human behaviors involved in the WiFi sharing
community, game theory model is naturally applied in this study. However, different
from the previous studies, where the complete information of users’ behaviors can
be observed, in this scheme, users’ behaviors only can be partially observed. We
design a pure software solution to make it practical and acceptable for most common
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users. Consequently, a punishment mechanism is provided to compensate for the
incomplete monitoring mechanism. It is then shown from both theoretical and ex-
perimental results, that users cannot cheat or exploit this partially monitored system
to gain anything, and at the same time, rationally played users finally converge to a
Pareto efficient equilibrium. From this work, we found that game theory could give us
insightful ideas to design and analyze practical systems. Game theory is not simply
a theoretical model to help us obtain some mathematical results, but also can lead
us to develop some practical solutions. When we say “applying game theory”, we do
not mean that we simply generate a problem to fit the game theory model; instead,
we mean to use game theory to well understand users’ behaviors in the problem and
address all the possible practical considerations in the game model. In this case, we
utilized game theory to help us have a deep understanding of the studied problem
and solve it.
After that, we provided a priority pricing scheme to solve the fairness problem in
the credit-based system. We met this fairness problem during our previous study on
the cooperation scheme in WCNs and later we found that almost all the credit-based
systems have this problem, where some users earn a lot more credits than they need,
while some others earn too few credits than they need. As we argued in chapter 1,
we do not believe that users in a sharing community would like to pay real money
for the shared service, so this problem has to be solved inside the community, instead
of expecting users to pay real money. Hence a priority pricing scheme is provided
on the previous WiFi sharing system to balance the credits among rich and poor
users. In short, the rich pay more credits for better service and the poor pay less
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for longer delayed service but larger percentage of fullfilled demand. Our results
show that all the users can converge to a competitive equilibrium, where all the users
can have 100% demand satisfied in theory. Quite different from the previous market
formulation [32], where each user is constrained by a constant bandwidth or capacity,
this work provides us an exact competitive market formulation, where each user is
only constrained by the credits earned from other users, since in the WiFi sharing
community the bandwidth is normally not an issue. Therefore, we hope this study
can give other researchers some ideas on applying competitive equilibrium concepts,
which can be regarded as a special version of Nash equilibrium, in wireless networks,
since few previous work have applied this approach.
6.1 Future Work
The future researchers can further investigate this field in the following issues:
• Implementation of Coverage Game: in the coverage game, we theoretically an-
alyze the optimality and complexity of the SNECA and ANECA algorithms. It
will be very challenging to implement these algorithms using the existing sensor
network platform and distribute them in the field to investigate the algorithm
performance in the real world. It will be interesting to study whether the
network still can converge under the practical noisy environment. If not, how
should we further improve the algorithms to address the practical environment
requirements.
• Real life user behaviors in the WiFi Sharing Game: in the WiFi sharing game,
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we did some experiments using the real world WiFi trace data, however, this
data only addresses the users’ network access patterns. Regarding the other
more complex user behaviors, e.g. cooperation and competition, cheating and
punishment, etc., for now we only analyze them in a theoretical way, and
make some simply assumptions in our experiment. The future researchers can
consider to do the experiments in a real WiFi sharing community networks (e.g.
FON), so that they can have the real world users’ cooperation and competition
behaviors in WiFi sharing, and thus further improve our WiFi sharing design
to improve the whole community performance.
In summary, in this thesis, we investigated several aspects of wireless networking
to which game theoretical methods can be beneficially applied, and obtained several
interesting results. We hope this work can serve as a useful guide of this field to other
researchers and inspire them to further investigate this field.
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